Rational Consensus in Science and Society

Lehrer, Keith; Wagner, Carl

doi:10.1007/978-94-009-8520-9

Cited by 387 publications

(111 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

109

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…The model was first developed as a descriptive mathematical model of group power relations in French (1956) and as a general model of consensus formation in DeGroot (1974). While DeGroot intended his model to be normative, his research focused on the fundamental mathematical properties of the model, leaving the interpretation, further elaboration, and philosophical justification to Lehrer and Wagner (1981).…”

Section: Models Of Rational Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Clearly, this mechanism makes the Lehrer-Wagner model a paradigmatic representative of gradual opinion convergence through mutual respect: it is a function of original estimates and respect assignments, and it is gradual in the sense that, in most cases, a single application of the aggregation procedure is not sufficient to ensure convergence. Lehrer and Wagner (1981) show that under very weak constraints, the sequence ðW k Þ k2N converges to a matrix W 1 where all rows are identical, that is, where all agents agree on their relative weights (see also Jackson and Golub 2007). In other words, the agents do not only achieve consensus on the issue under consideration (i.e., all entries of W 1 v are equal), but they also agree on the effective relative weight of each group member, that is, each other's expertise.…”

Section: Models Of Rational Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect

Martini

Sprenger

Colyvan

2012

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper explores the scope and limits of rational consensus through mutual respect, with the primary focus on the best known formal model of consensus: the Lehrer-Wagner model. We consider various arguments against the rationality of the Lehrer-Wagner model as a model of consensus about factual matters. We conclude that models such as this face problems in achieving rational consensus on disagreements about unknown factual matters, but that they hold considerable promise as models of how to rationally resolve non-factual disagreements.

show abstract

Section: Models Of Rational Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Models Of Rational Consensusmentioning

confidence: 99%

Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect

Martini

Sprenger

Colyvan

2012

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…16 In a strategic context there are clear relations to the concept of theory absorption as in Morgenstern (1972), Morgenstern and Schwödiauer (1976), Dacey (1976) on the one hand and to the dynamics of rational deliberation as in Skyrms (1990) on the other. In a non-strategic context implied consent models may be relevantly related to Lehrer and Wagner (1981). We are, however, interested in kinds of deliberation that are close to actual boundedly rational processes of deliberation as originally in Rawls (1951).…”

Section: The Search For An Equilibrium In Scientific Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

What ethics can learn from experimental economics — If anything

Güth¹,

Kliemt

2010

European Journal of Political Economy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractRelying on the specific example of ultimatum bargaining experiments this paper explores the possible role of empirical knowledge of behavioural "norm(ative) facts" within the search for an inter-personal (W)RE -(Wide) Reflective Equilibrium on normative issues. Assuming that pro-social behaviour "reveals" ethical orientations, it is argued that these "norm-facts" can and should be used along with stated preferences in justificatory arguments of normative ethics and economics of the "means to given ends" variety.JEL Classification: D673, D64, D7, K00, Z13,

show abstract

“…Other axiomatic characterizations of linear pooling are given by Mongin (1995) and Chambers (2007). See also Lehrer and Wagner (1981), who use linear opinion pooling to build a theory of consensus formation in groups. might wish to give each individual a greater weight in determining the collective probability for events within his or her area of expertise than for events outside that area.…”

Section: Linear Pooling: the Eventwise Independent Approachmentioning

confidence: 99%

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling

Dietrich

List

2017

Oxford Handbooks Online

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This chapter is a review of several proposed solutions to this problem, focusing on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). Axiomatic characterizations of each class of pooling functions are presented (most characterizations are classic results, but one is new), with the argument that linear pooling can be justified “procedurally” but not “epistemically”, while the other two pooling methods can be justified “epistemically”. The choice between them, in turn, depends on whether the individuals' probability assignments are based on shared information or on private information. In conclusion a number of other pooling methods are mentioned.

show abstract

Rational Consensus in Science and Society

Cited by 387 publications

References 0 publications

Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect

Resolving Disagreement Through Mutual Respect

What ethics can learn from experimental economics — If anything

Probabilistic Opinion Pooling

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About