Randomized Partial Checking Revisited

Khazaei, Shahram; Wikström, Douglas

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36095-4_8

Cited by 19 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…As noted in [13], duplicate elimination is necessary to prevent a serious attack on privacy. We therefore need to fix some details of the procedure of duplicate elimination (see below).…”

Section: Chaumian Rpc MIX Netmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We note that sometimes heuristics are implemented by which this assumption can be dropped (see [11]). However, as pointed out in [13], especially in the case of in-phase auditing, this leads to problems.…”

Section: Description Of the Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, one verifies the decryption proofs. As pointed out in [13], the third step, which often has been omitted in implementations and is not mentioned in [11], is crucial for verifiability and privacy.…”

Section: Description Of the Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cheating by any mix server. This attack, which seems to have been sketched already in [13] and is illustrated on the right-hand side of Figure 2, can be applied to the first mixing step of any mix server. The idea is that a mix server M j for two positions p and q in its intermediate sequence C 2 j+1 of ciphertexts sets both…”

Section: Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, none that provides formal security guarantees for privacy or verifiability/accountability. As mentioned, Kahazei and Wikström [13] point out and discuss attacks. In [8], the authors study the distance between the probability distribution of the permutation links in RPC mix nets and the uniform distribution, however, as also pointed out in [13], this result does not capture privacy or verifiability of RPC mix nets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Formal Analysis of Chaumian Mix Nets with Randomized Partial Checking

Küsters

Truderung

Vogt

2014

2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

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Mix nets with randomized partial checking (RPC mix nets) have been introduced by Jakobsson, Juels, and Rivest as particularly simple and efficient verifiable mix nets. These mix nets have been used in several implementations of prominent e-voting systems to provide vote privacy and verifiability. In RPC mix nets, higher efficiency is traded for a lower level of privacy and verifiability. However, these mix nets have never undergone a rigorous formal analysis. Recently, Kahazei and Wikström even pointed out several severe problems in the original proposal and in implementations of RPC mix nets in e-voting systems, both for so-called re-encryption and Chaumian RPC mix nets. While Kahazei and Wikström proposed several fixes, the security status of Chaumian RPC mix nets (with the fixes applied) has been left open; re-encryption RPC mix nets, as they suggest, should not be used at all.In this paper, we provide the first formal security analysis of Chaumian RPC mix nets. We propose security definitions that allow one to measure the level of privacy and verifiability RPC mix nets offer, and then based on these definitions, carry out a rigorous analysis. Altogether, our results show that these mix nets provide a reasonable level of privacy and verifiability, and that they are still an interesting option for the use in e-voting systems.

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“…As noted in [13], duplicate elimination is necessary to prevent a serious attack on privacy. We therefore need to fix some details of the procedure of duplicate elimination (see below).…”

Section: Chaumian Rpc MIX Netmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Description Of the Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Description Of the Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Formal Analysis of Chaumian Mix Nets with Randomized Partial Checking

Küsters

Truderung

Vogt

2014

2014 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy

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Towards Model Checking of Voting Protocols in Uppaal

Jamroga

Kurpiewski

et al. 2020

Electronic Voting

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Optimal Randomized Partial Checking for Decryption Mix Nets

Haines

Müller

2021

Information Security and Privacy

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One of the most important verifiability techniques for mix nets is randomized partial checking (RPC). This method is employed in a number of prominent secure e-voting systems, including Prêt à Voter, Civitas, and Scantegrity II, some of which have also been used for real political elections including in Australia. Unfortunately, it turned out that there exists a significant gap between the intended and the actual verifiability tolerance of the original RPC protocol. This mismatch affects exactly the "Achilles heel" of RPC, namely those application scenarios where manipulating a few messages can swap the final result (e.g., in close runoff elections). In this work, we propose the first RPC protocol which closes the aforementioned gap for decryption mix nets. We prove that our new RPC protocol achieves an optimal verifiability level, without introducing any disadvantages. Current implementations of RPC for decryption mix nets, in particular for real-world secure e-voting, should adopt our changes to improve their security.

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Randomized Partial Checking Revisited

Cited by 19 publications

References 22 publications

Formal Analysis of Chaumian Mix Nets with Randomized Partial Checking

Formal Analysis of Chaumian Mix Nets with Randomized Partial Checking

Towards Model Checking of Voting Protocols in Uppaal

Optimal Randomized Partial Checking for Decryption Mix Nets

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