Quantifying the influence of the tobacco industry on EU governance: automated content analysis of the EU Tobacco Products Directive

Abstract

ObjectiveThe tobacco industry spends large sums lobbying the European Union (EU) institutions, yet whether such lobbying significantly affects tobacco policy is not well understood. We used novel quantitative text mining techniques to evaluate the impact of industry pressure on the contested EU Tobacco Products Directive revision.DesignPolicy positions of 18 stakeholders including the tobacco industry, health NGOs and tobacco retailers were evaluated using their text submissions to EU consultations and impact assessments. Using Wordscores to calculate word frequencies, we developed a scale ranging from 0–tobacco industry to 1–public health organisations, which was then used to track changes in the policy position of the European Commission's 2010 consultation document, its 2012 final proposal and the European Parliament and Council's approved legislation in March 2014.ResultsSeveral stakeholders’ positions were closer to the tobacco industry than that of health NGOs, including retailers (ω=0.35), trade unions (ω=0.34) and publishers (ω=0.33 and ω=0.40). Over time the European Commission's position shifted towards the tobacco industry from ω=0.52 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.54) to ω=0.40 (95% CI 0.39 to 0.42). This transition reflected an increasing use of words pertaining to business and the economy in the Commission's document. Our findings were robust to alternative methods of scoring policy positions in EU documents.ConclusionsUsing quantitative text mining techniques, we observed that tobacco industry lobbying activity at the EU was associated with significant policy shifts in the EU Tobacco Products Directive legislation towards the tobacco industry's submissions. In the light of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, additional governance strategies are needed to prevent undue influence of the tobacco industry on EU policy making.

studying preference attainment using spatial models

“…The strength of this spatial assumption varies greatly among studies, moving from those considering space in what Benoit and Laver (2012) call an orientational manner to explicitly spatial models of political competition. Nonetheless, even in the latter the political space is considered as being unidimensional, such as more or less regulation (Klüver, 2011(Klüver, , 2013Yackee and Yackee, 2006;Yackee, 2004Yackee, , 2006, the closeness to opposite interests (Costa et al, 2014) or the degree of approval on a proposal (Bernhagen, 2012). Also very recent attempts to rejuvenate the preference attainment concept (Bernhagen et al, 2014) still rely on the assumption of a one-dimensional political space.…”

“…Then, the researcher reduces the political space into dimensions and/or factors. Actors' preferences on those dimensions/factors are either a priori assumed (Dür, 2008a) or inferred from data through interviews/surveys (Mahoney, 2007;Baumgartner et al, 2009;Bernhagen et al, 2014;Gilens and Page, 2014) and various documents (Klüver, 2011(Klüver, , 2013Yackee and Yackee, 2006, Yackee, 2004Costa et al, 2014) and the same is done for the initial and final policy outputs. 1 Then, the researcher measures whether and to what extent the final policy output has moved towards the actors' preferences.…”

“…Scholars address interest group influence by applying preference attainment in several domains: US regulatory agencies Yackee, 2004Yackee, , 2006; US legislatures (Baumgartner et al, 2009;Gilens and Page, 2014;Mahoney, 2007); UK legislatures (Bernhagen, 2012) and the European Union (EU) (Klüver, 2013;Mahoney, 2007;Neuman et al, 2002;Costa et al, 2014). This approach conceives the political space as determined by individual issues.…”

“…As for large N observational studies, the methodological approach used has so far been an a priori one following methodological needs rather than theoretical guidance. The researcher identifies a dimension which is as externally valid as possible, for instance more regulation v. less regulation or the level of support for a proposal, and, then, he or she either implicitly (Bernhagen, 2012, Bernhagen et al, 2014Costa et al, 2014) or explicitly (Klüver, 2011(Klüver, , 2013Yackee and Yackee, An a priori methodological approach to dimensionality bears a major issue: the justification of dimensions in terms of exhaustiveness (Benoit and Laver, 2012). In other words, by using an a priori methodology the researcher cannot know whether the dimensions selected are exhaustive.…”

Reflecting on ‘European policymaking on the tobacco advertising ban: the importance of escape routes’

“…A recent analysis that tracked changes in the text of the draft Directive as it passed through the legislative process showed how the wording changed, moving progressively away from that employed in submissions by public health organisations towards that used in tobacco industry submissions (Costa et al, 2014). However, the processes by which this happened have yet to be fully elucidated.…”