Public sector reform in a poor, aid-dependent country, Tanzania

Abstract

African public sectors went through many changes during the 1960s and 1970s in response to political, economic and social pressures. They expanded in size but remained, at least in design, hierarchical and centralized. Their formal relations to society did not undergo any significant changes either. Generally, the reforms now under way are significantly different from earlier ones. Most are inspired by the new public management (NPM) paradigm. They are also much more radical in their aims, among which are: to reduce the core functions of the state; redraw the boundaries between political and administrative responsibilities; emphasize efficiency; redefine relations between public and private sectors; strengthen accountability; reduce corruption; reorganize organizations and staff; change values and attitudes; and exploit new technologies. This article focuses on a paradox of reform in Tanzania: multiple changes are pursued in the public sector despite fragile domestic political support to the reform package as a whole and despite few service delivery improvements on the ground. It is argued that this is the result of substantial external influences, fragmented domestic policy making, weak links between policy making and implementation, and questionable assumptions about some of the key NPM‐inspired reform measures. Moreover, the analyses highlight a number of differences with some of the recent reform literature. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Central government patronage, donor aid, and budget performance in local government: testing a mediation effect

“…Consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, inter-governmental fiscal transfers, institutionalization, and direct budget funding were found to positively influence budget performance. This finding is in line with previous empirical work which suggests that budgets in most Sub-Saharan African LGs largely depend on grants and are patronized by regulation (Keller, 2002;Ndulu & O'Connell, 1999;Therkildsen, 2000).…”

“…These relationships had been predicted in H3, 5, and 6. These findings are, however, in line with (Alesina & Weder, 2003;Livingstone & Charlton, 2001;Therkildsen, 2000) studies which found that when central government audits are compromised by LG staff, they may not create any positive effect on budget performance. The studies also observe negative outcome on performance in situations of corruption in donor funded projects and poor training needs identification in case of capacity building.…”

Central government patronage, donor aid, and budget performance in local government: testing a mediation effect

“…Consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, inter-governmental fiscal transfers, institutionalization, and direct budget funding were found to positively influence budget performance. This finding is in line with previous empirical work which suggests that budgets in most Sub-Saharan African LGs largely depend on grants and are patronized by regulation (Keller, 2002;Ndulu & O'Connell, 1999;Therkildsen, 2000).…”

“…These relationships had been predicted in H3, 5, and 6. These findings are, however, in line with (Alesina & Weder, 2003;Livingstone & Charlton, 2001;Therkildsen, 2000) studies which found that when central government audits are compromised by LG staff, they may not create any positive effect on budget performance. The studies also observe negative outcome on performance in situations of corruption in donor funded projects and poor training needs identification in case of capacity building.…”

Public management and regulatory governance: problems of policy transfer to developing countries

“…Moreover, giving to the managers of regulated services simultaneously more discretion and more financial responsibility appears to put in place precisely those conditions which may lead to increased corruption, (Harriss-White and White, 1996); while giving more autonomy to regulators (by taking them outside government frameworks) is unlikely to reduce regulatory and political capture where constitutional, legal and public interest mechanisms of accountability are deficient. As limited experiments with executive agencies in developing countries have shown, where there is a conflict between economic efficiency objectives and the internal dynamics of political governance, the imperatives of politics will usually prevail (Harrison 2001,Therkildsen 2000. One conclusion we might draw here is that accountability finally is underwritten less by formal institutions than by relations of trust, the argument that now makes the running in the regulatory literature in developed economies, as discussed earlier (Moran, 2002, Braithwaite 1999.…”

The incidence of local government allocations in Tanzania

“…Finally, urban government officials might simply have more political clout within the central government than rural local governments. For instance, unlike in urban areas, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling political party, faces no political opposition in rural areas (Mukandala, 1998;Therkildsen, 2000). As a result, one could postulate that the central government feels no real political pressure to 'buy' the loyalty of rural political leaders.…”

Central government patronage, donor aid, and budget performance in local government: testing a mediation effect

“…Consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, inter-governmental fiscal transfers, institutionalization, and direct budget funding were found to positively influence budget performance. This finding is in line with previous empirical work which suggests that budgets in most Sub-Saharan African LGs largely depend on grants and are patronized by regulation (Keller, 2002;Ndulu & O'Connell, 1999;Therkildsen, 2000).…”

“…These relationships had been predicted in H3, 5, and 6. These findings are, however, in line with (Alesina & Weder, 2003;Livingstone & Charlton, 2001;Therkildsen, 2000) studies which found that when central government audits are compromised by LG staff, they may not create any positive effect on budget performance. The studies also observe negative outcome on performance in situations of corruption in donor funded projects and poor training needs identification in case of capacity building.…”

Public management and regulatory governance: problems of policy transfer to developing countries

“…Moreover, giving to the managers of regulated services simultaneously more discretion and more financial responsibility appears to put in place precisely those conditions which may lead to increased corruption, (Harriss-White and White, 1996); while giving more autonomy to regulators (by taking them outside government frameworks) is unlikely to reduce regulatory and political capture where constitutional, legal and public interest mechanisms of accountability are deficient. As limited experiments with executive agencies in developing countries have shown, where there is a conflict between economic efficiency objectives and the internal dynamics of political governance, the imperatives of politics will usually prevail (Harrison 2001,Therkildsen 2000. One conclusion we might draw here is that accountability finally is underwritten less by formal institutions than by relations of trust, the argument that now makes the running in the regulatory literature in developed economies, as discussed earlier (Moran, 2002, Braithwaite 1999.…”

The incidence of local government allocations in Tanzania

“…Finally, urban government officials might simply have more political clout within the central government than rural local governments. For instance, unlike in urban areas, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling political party, faces no political opposition in rural areas (Mukandala, 1998;Therkildsen, 2000). As a result, one could postulate that the central government feels no real political pressure to 'buy' the loyalty of rural political leaders.…”

Central government patronage, donor aid, and budget performance in local government: testing a mediation effect

“…Consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4, inter-governmental fiscal transfers, institutionalization, and direct budget funding were found to positively influence budget performance. This finding is in line with previous empirical work which suggests that budgets in most Sub-Saharan African LGs largely depend on grants and are patronized by regulation (Keller, 2002;Ndulu & O'Connell, 1999;Therkildsen, 2000).…”

“…These relationships had been predicted in H3, 5, and 6. These findings are, however, in line with (Alesina & Weder, 2003;Livingstone & Charlton, 2001;Therkildsen, 2000) studies which found that when central government audits are compromised by LG staff, they may not create any positive effect on budget performance. The studies also observe negative outcome on performance in situations of corruption in donor funded projects and poor training needs identification in case of capacity building.…”

Public management and regulatory governance: problems of policy transfer to developing countries

“…Moreover, giving to the managers of regulated services simultaneously more discretion and more financial responsibility appears to put in place precisely those conditions which may lead to increased corruption, (Harriss-White and White, 1996); while giving more autonomy to regulators (by taking them outside government frameworks) is unlikely to reduce regulatory and political capture where constitutional, legal and public interest mechanisms of accountability are deficient. As limited experiments with executive agencies in developing countries have shown, where there is a conflict between economic efficiency objectives and the internal dynamics of political governance, the imperatives of politics will usually prevail (Harrison 2001,Therkildsen 2000. One conclusion we might draw here is that accountability finally is underwritten less by formal institutions than by relations of trust, the argument that now makes the running in the regulatory literature in developed economies, as discussed earlier (Moran, 2002, Braithwaite 1999.…”

The incidence of local government allocations in Tanzania

“…Finally, urban government officials might simply have more political clout within the central government than rural local governments. For instance, unlike in urban areas, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the ruling political party, faces no political opposition in rural areas (Mukandala, 1998;Therkildsen, 2000). As a result, one could postulate that the central government feels no real political pressure to 'buy' the loyalty of rural political leaders.…”