Psychophysical and theoretical identifications

Lewis, David

doi:10.1080/00048407212341301

Cited by 938 publications

(242 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…In other words, each type of functional state is identical to a type of physical state [Armstrong 1968], [Lewis 1966], [Lewis 1972]. Thus, Functionalism 2.0 is consistent with the type-identity theory of mind: mental state types are physical state types [Place 1956], [Smart 1959].…”

Section: Functionalism 20mentioning

confidence: 73%

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Maley¹,

Piccinini²

2013

philosophiascientiae

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Résumé : Le fonctionnalisme est une solution populaire au problème espritcorps. Il a un certain nombre de versions. Nous en exposons certaines parmi les principales, en énumérant une partie de leurs caractéristiques les plus importantes ainsi que certains « bugs » qui les ont entachées. Nous présentons comment les différentes variantes sont liées. Nombreux ont été les pessimistes à propos des perspectives du fonctionnalisme, mais la plupart des critiques ne tiennent pas compte des dernières mises à jour. Nous finissons en suggé-rant une variante du fonctionnalisme qui fournit une description complète de l'esprit.Abstract: Functionalism is a popular solution to the mind-body problem. It has a number of versions. We outline some of the major releases of functionalism, listing some of their important features as well as some of the bugs that plagued these releases. We outline how different versions are related. Many have been pessimistic about functionalism's prospects, but most criticisms have missed the latest upgrades. We end by suggesting a version of functionalism that provides a complete account of the mind.The mind-body problem is the problem of how the mental relates to the physical. We know they are intimately involved: the physical affects the mental when our body is injured and we feel pain, or when we drink alcohol and feel intoxicated; the mental affects the physical when we decide to retrieve a book and reach for it, or when we perceive the signal to cross the street and begin walking. The first solution that comes to mind is dualism: the view that the mental and physical are two different kinds of thing. While dualism is intuitively appealing, it faces such serious difficulties (how to account for the intimate connections between the mental and the physical, how the mental and the physical could possibly interact, etc.) that it's been mostly abandoned. The other option is monism, according to which the mental and the physical

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Section: Functionalism 20mentioning

confidence: 73%

“…Presumably not all of them, but then how are the relevant causal relations picked out? Functionalism 1.0 Functionalism 1.0, the first working release, includes the feature that functional states are specified by a folk psychological theory [ Lewis 1972]. Folk psychology specifies a number of platitudes about the mind.…”

Section: Functionalism Beta Versionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Maley¹,

Piccinini²

2013

philosophiascientiae

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“…. x n i that jointly satisfy the Ramsified psychological theory relating mental states to one another and to inputs and outputs (Lewis 1972). Very crudely speaking, we can think of a functional role as involving three components: in, out and sideways.…”

Section: Functionalism and Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness

Prosser

2006

Philos Stud

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In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.

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“…Viewed from a Darwinian perspective, the function of the brain is to control the animal to act in ways conducive to survival and reproductive success in the given environment. In referring to sensations, perceptions, feelings, desires, states of awareness, imaginings, thoughts, decisions to act, we are referring to neurological processes going on in the brain from the standpoint of their role in guiding or controlling action: detecting bodily 3 Some functionalists take the analogy with the computer and the Turing Universal Machine very seriously, and hold that a major task is to give definitions to interconnected psychological terms: see (Putnam, 1960;Lewis, 1972;Rey, 1997). The latter is a characteristic obsession of analytic philosophy: for a corrective see (Popper, 1962: pp.…”

Section: Functionalism If Correct Solves the Three Fundamental Probmentioning

confidence: 99%

Three Philosophical Problems about Consciousness and their Possible Resolution

Maxwell

2011

OJPP

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Three big philosophical problems about consciousness are: Why does it exist? How do we explain and understand it? How can we explain brain-consciousness correlations? If functionalism were true, all three problems would be solved. But it is false, and that means all three problems remain unsolved (in that there is no other obvious candidate for a solution). Here, it is argued that the first problem cannot have a solution; this is inherent in the nature of explanation. The second problem is solved by recognizing that (a) there is an explanation as to why science cannot explain consciousness, and (b) consciousness can be explained by a different kind of explanation, empathic or "personalistic" explanation, compatible with, but not reducible to, scientific explanation. The third problem is solved by exploiting David Chalmers' "principle of structural coherence", and involves postulating that sensations experienced by us-visual, auditory, tactile, and so on-amount to minute scattered regions in a vast, multi-dimensional "space" of all possible sensations, which vary smoothly, and in a linear way, throughout the space. There is also the space of all possible sentient brain processes. There is just one, unique one-one mapping between these two spaces that preserves continuity and linearity. It is this which provides the explanation as to why brain processes and sensations are correlated as they are. I consider objections to this unique-matching theory, and consider how the theory might be empirically confirmed.

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Psychophysical and theoretical identifications

Cited by 938 publications

References 2 publications

Get the Latest Upgrade: Functionalism 6.3.1

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The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness

Three Philosophical Problems about Consciousness and their Possible Resolution

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