ProtectIOn: Root-of-Trust for IO in Compromised Platforms

Dhar, Aritra; Ulqinaku, Enis; Kostiainen, Kari; Čapkun, Srđjan

doi:10.14722/ndss.2020.24112

Cited by 14 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Fidelius [23], and its successor ProtectIon [24], provide the secure input and output of sensitive information, such as credential fields in web forms. Fidelius uses enclaves, which implement the network (web) protocols, and a secure external device to accomplish its tasks.…”

Section: External Devicementioning

confidence: 99%

HyperIO: A Hypervisor-Based Framework for Secure IO

Kiperberg

Zaidenberg

2023

Applied Sciences

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Malware often attempts to steal input and output through human interface devices to obtain confidential information. We propose to use a thin hypervisor, called “HyperIO”, to realize a secure path between input and output devices using a partial implementation of device drivers. We apply our approach using two security systems built on HyperIO: FireSafe and ClipCrypt. FireSafe is a web browser extension which allows a remote web server to display and receive sensitive user information securely. ClipCrypt enables the user to securely enter and view their confidential information in commodity Windows applications.

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Section: External Devicementioning

confidence: 99%

HyperIO: A Hypervisor-Based Framework for Secure IO

Kiperberg

Zaidenberg

2023

Applied Sciences

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“…Examples of solutions that use a cryptographic trusted path include Fidelius [57] and HIX [56]. Sometimes, cryptographic channels may be multihop, i.e., include a trusted intermediate hardware component between the enclave and the device (e.g., Bastion SGX [58], ProtectIOn [59], and HETEE [60]). Cryptographic trusted paths at the link level (as opposed to high software levels) are emerging to protect specifically against A bus [61].…”

Section: Logical Cryptographicmentioning

confidence: 99%

SoK: Hardware-supported Trusted Execution Environments

Schneider¹,

Masti²,

Shinde³

et al. 2022

Preprint

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The growing complexity of modern computing platforms and the need for strong isolation protections among their software components has led to the increased adoption of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). While several commercial and academic TEE architectures have emerged in recent times, they remain hard to compare and contrast. More generally, existing TEEs have not been subject to a holistic systematization to understand the available design alternatives for various aspects of TEE design and their corresponding pros-and-cons.Therefore, in this work, we analyze the design of existing TEEs and systematize the mechanisms that TEEs implement to achieve their security goals, namely, verifiable launch, run-time isolation, trusted IO and secure storage. More specifically, we analyze the typical architectural building blocks underlying TEE solutions, design alternatives for each of these components and the trade-offs that they entail. We focus on hardware-assisted TEEs and cover a wide range of TEE proposals from academia and the industry. Our analysis shows that although TEEs are diverse in terms of their goals, usage models and instruction set architectures, they all share many common building blocks in terms of their design.

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“…Bump in the Wire-based Solutions Fidelius [ECB + 19], ProtectIOn [DUKC20], Inte-griScreen [SUD + 20], FPGA-based overlays [BT17], IntegriKey [DYKC17] are some of the trusted path solutions that use external trusted hardware devices as intermediaries between the platform and IO devices. These external devices create a trusted path between a remote user and the peripheral and enable the user to exchange sensitive data securely with the peripheral in the presence of an attacker-controlled OS.…”

Section: Related Work Tee-based Solutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution

Schneider

Dhar²,

Puddu

et al. 2021

TCHES

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The ever-rising computation demand is forcing the move from the CPU to heterogeneous specialized hardware, which is readily available across modern datacenters through disaggregated infrastructure. On the other hand, trusted execution environments (TEEs), one of the most promising recent developments in hardware security, can only protect code confined in the CPU, limiting TEEs’ potential and applicability to a handful of applications. We observe that the TEEs’ hardware trusted computing base (TCB) is fixed at design time, which in practice leads to using untrusted software to employ peripherals in TEEs. Based on this observation, we propose composite enclaves with a configurable hardware and software TCB, allowing enclaves access to multiple computing and IO resources. Finally, we present two case studies of composite enclaves: i) an FPGA platform based on RISC-V Keystone connected to emulated peripherals and sensors, and ii) a large-scale accelerator. These case studies showcase a flexible but small TCB (2.5 KLoC for IO peripherals and drivers), with a low-performance overhead (only around 220 additional cycles for a context switch), thus demonstrating the feasibility of our approach and showing that it can work with a wide range of specialized hardware.

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ProtectIOn: Root-of-Trust for IO in Compromised Platforms

Cited by 14 publications

References 14 publications

HyperIO: A Hypervisor-Based Framework for Secure IO

HyperIO: A Hypervisor-Based Framework for Secure IO

SoK: Hardware-supported Trusted Execution Environments

Composite Enclaves: Towards Disaggregated Trusted Execution

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