Problems and solutions for a hybrid approach to grounding practical normativity

Behrends, Jeff

doi:10.1080/00455091.2015.1047684

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…For defenses of source internalism, see Korsgaard (1996), Manne (2014), Markovits (2017), Railton (1986), Schroeder (2007), Smith (1994), Sobel (2016), Street (2009), and Williams (1981). 4 See Behrends (2015;, Chang (2013a;2013b), and Paul and Morton (2014).…”

Section: Introduction: Internalism Externalism and Extensional Adequacymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Can we outsource all the reasons?

Joshi

2022

Philos Stud

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Where does normativity come from? Or alternatively, in virtue of what do facts about what an agent has reason to do obtain? On one class of views, reason facts obtain in virtue of agents' motivations. It might seem like a truism that at least some of our reasons depend on what we desire or care about. However, some philosophers, notably Derek Parfit, have convincingly argued that no reasons are grounded in this way. Typically, this latter, externalist view of reasons has been thought to enjoy the advantage of extensional adequacy-that is, the ability to account for all the reasons we intuitively think people have. This paper provides a novel argument against this assumption by considering a type of case wherein the relative strengths of the agent's reasons can only be adequately explained by reference to what she cares about. Adding some further assumptions yields that there are at least some internally sourced reasons.

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Section: Introduction: Internalism Externalism and Extensional Adequacymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…6 For instance, see Smith(1994) and Schroeder (2007) on the reductionist/internalist side and Parfit (2011)and Shafer-Landau (2003on the non-reductionist/externalist side. 7 For a helpful overview of the terrain here, see Behrends (2016).…”

Section: Introduction: Internalism Externalism and Extensional Adequacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Can we outsource all the reasons?

Joshi

2022

Philos Stud

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“…Assuming that one cannot actually be suffering agony without (at that time) desiring it to stop, there is very significant difference between the conative states of one's present, agony-indifferent self, and one's near-future, agony-suffering self. It is not implausible to say that one has a moral reason to prevent one's future agony in this case.29 Chang (2013) andBehrends (2015), both hybrid theorists who think that some reasons are grounded in conative states and some aren't, do not seem to reject prudential reasons.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Parfit (1984: 127-9); alsoHubin (1980: 75).16 See e.g Chang (2013). andBehrends (2015).17 Desires are pro tanto, frequently unreflective/unendorsed, and less under our control than aims.18 The latter example is from Parfit (1984: 151-2). It is somewhat puzzling (and disappointing) that, having made an impressive case inReasons & Persons (see esp.…”

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confidence: 99%

Eliminating Prudential Reasons

Worsnip¹

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

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This chapter argues, contrary to the consensus of most contemporary Western ethics, that there are no (distinctively, fundamentally) prudential reasons for action. That is to say: there is no class of reasons for action that is distinctively and fundamentally about the promotion of the agent’s own well-being. Considerations to do with the agent’s well-being can supply the agent with reasons only in virtue of her well-being mattering morally or in virtue of her caring about her own well-being. In both of these cases, the way that such prudential considerations supply reasons for action is a way that the well-being of others can supply reasons for action too.

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“…(It's worth noting that weak objectivism has become prominent only in the years following the original publication of most of the essays in this volume. See, for example, the "hybrid" theories of Ruth Chang (2013) and Jeff Behrends (2015), as well as some versions of the Reasoning View, such as those defended by Kieran Setiya (2014) and myself (2016).) Sobel acknowledges the threat of weak objectivism, and (in a brief passage) suggests some further arguments against it.…”

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confidence: 99%

From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism

Asarnow

2019

The Philosophical Review

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Forthcoming in The Philosophical ReviewFrom Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism collects fifteen of David Sobel's papers on normative reasons, welfare, and ethics, many of which are contemporary classics. New here are a unifying introduction and the paper "Subjectivism and Reasons to be Moral." The volume would make a useful centerpiece to a graduate seminar focused on reasons, welfare, or consequentialism. And the new essay will be of great interest to anyone interested in normative reasons. A stalwart defender of subjectivism about normative reasons and welfare, Sobel is also a critic of those views, admitting he is "not at all confident that subjective accounts are correct" (8). Ethics and its neighboring fields would benefit if more practitioners shared Sobel's characteristic thoughtful humility, as well as the creativity, awareness of the history of philosophy, and attention to detail so often manifest in this excellent volume.

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Problems and solutions for a hybrid approach to grounding practical normativity

Cited by 6 publications

References 24 publications

Can we outsource all the reasons?

Can we outsource all the reasons?

Eliminating Prudential Reasons

From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism

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