Privacy and genetic genealogy data

Greytak, Ellen M.; Kaye, David H.; Budowle, Bruce; Moore, Ce Ce; Armentrout, Steven

doi:10.1126/science.aav0330

Cited by 22 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Long-range familial search raises a range of privacy concerns (Court, 2018; Ram et al, 2018; Kennett, 2019; Scudder et al, 2019). One response from advocates of long-range search has been to note that “raw genetic data are not disclosed to law enforcement...Search results display only the length and chromosomal location of shared DNA blocks” (Greytak et al, 2018). However, the methods we describe here illustrate that there are several ways to reveal users’ raw genetic data on the basis of the locations of shared DNA blocks.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attacks on genetic privacy via uploads to genealogical databases

Edge

Coop

2019

Preprint

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7Direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetics services are increasingly popular for genetic genealogy, with 8 tens of millions of customers as of 2019. Several DTC genealogy services allow users to upload 9 their own genetic datasets in order to search for genetic relatives. A user and a target person in 10 the database are identified as genetic relatives if the user's uploaded genome shares one or more 11 sufficiently long segments in common with that of the target person-that is, if the two genomes 12 share one or more long regions identical by state (IBS). IBS matches reveal some information 13 about the genotypes of the target person, particularly if the chromosomal locations of IBS matches 14 are shared with the uploader. Here, we describe several methods by which an adversary who 15 wants to learn the genotypes of people in the database can do so by uploading multiple datasets. 16Depending on the methods used for IBS matching and the information about IBS segments 17 returned to the user, substantial information about users' genotypes can be revealed with a few 18 hundred uploaded datasets. For example, using a method we call IBS tiling, we estimate that an 19 adversary who uploads approximately 900 publicly available genomes could recover at least one 20 allele at SNP sites across up to 82% of the genome of a median person of European ancestries. 21In databases that detect IBS segments using unphased genotypes, approximately 100 uploads of 22 falsified datasets can reveal enough genetic information to allow accurate genome-wide imputation 23 of every person in the database. We provide simple-to-implement suggestions that will prevent the 24 exploits we describe and discuss our results in light of recent trends in genetic privacy, including 25 the recent use of uploads to DTC genetic genealogy services by law enforcement. 26(Regalado, 2019). One of the major applications of DTC genetics has been genetic genealogy. 31Customers of companies such as 23andMe and Ancestry, once they are genotyped, can view a list 32 of other customers who are likely to be genetic relatives. These putative relatives' full names are 33 often given, and sometimes contact details are given as well. Such genealogical matching services 34 are of interest to people who want to find distant genetic relatives to extend their family tree, and 35 can be particularly useful to people who otherwise may not have information about their genetic 36 relatives, such as adoptees or the biological children of sperm donors. Several genetic genealogy 37 services-including GEDmatch, MyHeritage, FamilyTreeDNA, and LivingDNA (Table 1)-allow 38 users to upload their own genetic data if they have been genotyped by another company. These 39 entities generally offer some subset of their services at no charge to uploaders, which helps to 40 grow their databases. Upload services have also been used by law enforcement, with the goal of 41 identifying relatives of the source of a crime-scene sample (Erlich et al., 2018; Edge and Coop, 42 2019), prompting discussion abo...

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Attacks on genetic privacy via uploads to genealogical databases

Edge

Coop

2019

Preprint

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“…A letter to the editor of the journal Science notes several factors that mitigate the threat to privacy: (1) “only data voluntarily uploaded and explicitly made public are searched” as “investigations have relied on data that individuals have chosen to download from a testing company’s database and upload to GEDmatch,” (2) “no one is legally required to contribute to a genetic genealogy database, and because the samples are not in the possession of government agencies, these searches are substantially different from familial searching of law enforcement databases,” (3) “raw genetic data are not disclosed to law enforcement” – rather “search results display only the length and chromosomal location of shared DNA blocks, which are used to determine approximate kinship relationships between individuals,” and (4) “genetic genealogy is for lead generation, not conviction” [ 40 ].…”

Section: Investigative Genetic Genealogymentioning

confidence: 99%

Interpol review of forensic biology and forensic DNA typing 2016-2019

Butler

Willis

2020

Forensic Science International: Synergy

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“…However, the raw genetic data is not disclosed to law enforcement agencies, and it is only the amount of DNA shared and the length of the shared segments that are used to infer relationships. [13] Nevertheless, the genotype data can sometimes reveal sensitive information, and in some cases the raw data has been made available to the genealogists working on the analysis.…”

Section: Privacy and Security Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[12] By the end of January 2019 they had identified suspects or victims in 25 cold cases. [13] The methodology is described in a paper by Greytak et al [14] In January 2019 the DTC genetic testing company FamilyTreeDNA (FTDNA) announced that it was testing samples for the FBI and allowing them to upload profiles to its database. [15] Bode Technology announced the launch of a forensic genealogy service in February 2019.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The proprietary techniques used by Parabon, the DNA Doe Project and the other companies are still experimental and have not been subjected to peer review, creating concerns about transparency and accountability [67]. [76] However, it is important to note that genetic genealogy is intended to be used to generate investigative leads and not for conviction [13]. Once the possible name of the suspect or missing person has been identified, standard forensic DNA testing is carried out to see if there is a match between the person of interest and the crime scene sample.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Using genetic genealogy databases in missing persons cases and to develop suspect leads in violent crimes

Kennett

2019

Forensic Science International

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Highlights • Genetic genealogy databases produce investigative leads in cold and active cases. • Many people in the databases have not given informed consent for law enforcement use. • There is an unknown number of minors in the databases. • You are affected if you have a relative in the databases even if you have not tested. • International interdisciplinary best practice guidelines are needed.

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Privacy and genetic genealogy data

Cited by 22 publications

References 3 publications

Attacks on genetic privacy via uploads to genealogical databases

Attacks on genetic privacy via uploads to genealogical databases

Interpol review of forensic biology and forensic DNA typing 2016-2019

Using genetic genealogy databases in missing persons cases and to develop suspect leads in violent crimes

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