Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets

Singer, Yoram; Mittal, Manas

doi:10.1145/2488388.2488489

Cited by 195 publications

(141 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…One claimed benefit of crowdsourcing is that it can greatly reduce cost [55]. Yet, determining an appropriate price is a key challenge for crowdsourcing in general [29,75], and also for software development specifically [55,59].…”

Section: Motivation and Remunerationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two's company, three's a crowd: a case study of crowdsourcing software development

Stol

Fitzgerald

2014

Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Software Engineering

170

125

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Crowdsourcing is an emerging and promising approach which involves delegating a variety of tasks to an unknown workforcethe crowd. Crowdsourcing has been applied quite successfully in various contexts from basic tasks on Amazon Mechanical Turk to solving complex industry problems, e.g. InnoCentive. Companies are increasingly using crowdsourcing to accomplish specific software development tasks. However, very little research exists on this specific topic. This paper presents an in-depth industry case study of crowdsourcing software development at a multinational corporation. Our case study highlights a number of challenges that arise when crowdsourcing software development. For example, the crowdsourcing development process is essentially a waterfall model and this must eventually be integrated with the agile approach used by the company. Crowdsourcing works better for specific software development tasks that are less complex and stand-alone without interdependencies. The development cost was much greater than originally expected, overhead in terms of company effort to prepare specifications and answer crowdsourcing community queries was much greater, and the time-scale to complete contests, review submissions and resolve quality issues was significant. Finally, quality issues were pushed later in the lifecycle given the lengthy process necessary to identify and resolve quality issues. Given the emphasis in software engineering on identifying bugs as early as possible, this is quite problematic.

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Section: Motivation and Remunerationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Two's company, three's a crowd: a case study of crowdsourcing software development

Stol

Fitzgerald

2014

Proceedings of the 36th International Conference on Software Engineering

170

125

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Incentives may come in two different forms: extrinsic incentives (e.g., rewards) and intrinsic incentives (e.g., worker status). Several studies have identified direct relations between incentives and output quality and/or task execution speed [Singer and Mittal 2013]. -Terms and conditions: These are the general rules and arrangements that govern the work relationship between the requester and the workers.…”

Section: Crowdsourcing Quality Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quality Control in Crowdsourcing

et al. 2018

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Crowdsourcing enables one to leverage on the intelligence and wisdom of potentially large groups of individuals toward solving problems. Common problems approached with crowdsourcing are labeling images, translating or transcribing text, providing opinions or ideas, and similar -all tasks that computers are not good at or where they may even fail altogether. The introduction of humans into computations and/or everyday work, however, also poses critical, novel challenges in terms of quality control, as the crowd is typically composed of people with unknown and very diverse abilities, skills, interests, personal objectives and technological resources. This survey studies quality in the context of crowdsourcing along several dimensions, so as to define and characterize it and to understand the current state of the art. Specifically, this survey derives a quality model for crowdsourcing tasks, identifies the methods and techniques that can be used to assess the attributes of the model, and the actions and strategies that help prevent and mitigate quality problems. An analysis of how these features are supported by the state of the art further identifies open issues and informs an outlook on hot future research directions.

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“…Most of existing incentive mechanisms mainly focus on utility maximization and cost minimization of the server. In [14], Singer and Mittal proposed a pricing mechanism, which enables automating the process of pricing and allocating tasks for requesters in complex markets. In [15], Duan et al considered different incentive mechanisms to motivate the collaboration of smartphone users on data acquisition and distributed computing.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanism for Participatory Sensing Systems

Niu¹,

Wang²,

Ye³

et al. 2018

Security and Communication Networks

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The proliferation of mobile devices has facilitated the prevalence of participatory sensing applications in which participants collect and share information in their environments. The design of a participatory sensing application confronts two challenges: "privacy" and "incentive" which are two conflicting objectives and deserve deeper attention. Inspired by physical currency circulation system, this paper introduces the notion of E-cent, an exchangeable unit bearer currency. Participants can use the E-cent to take part in tasks anonymously. By employing E-cent, we propose an E-cent-based privacy-preserving incentive mechanism, called EPPI. As a dynamic balance regulatory mechanism, EPPI can not only protect the privacy of participant, but also adjust the whole system to the ideal situation, under which the rated tasks can be finished at minimal cost. To the best of our knowledge, EPPI is the first attempt to build an incentive mechanism while maintaining the desired privacy in participatory sensing systems. Extensive simulation and analysis results show that EPPI can achieve high anonymity level and remarkable incentive effects.

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Pricing mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets

Cited by 195 publications

References 19 publications

Two's company, three's a crowd: a case study of crowdsourcing software development

Two's company, three's a crowd: a case study of crowdsourcing software development

Quality Control in Crowdsourcing

A Privacy-Preserving Incentive Mechanism for Participatory Sensing Systems

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