delay) as reasons why we should force drug prices lower. The anticompetitive behaviors are particularly distressing because they distort the original intent of the patent system by extending the patent protections beyond their intent.Although the facts about profits, government funding to support innovation, and company behaviors are true, the evidence nevertheless suggests that innovation does respond to profits. [4][5][6] Profits encourage innovation by attracting capital to support innovation and raising the acquisition price when companies with innovative products are acquired by other companies (which incentivizes innovation). But this does not mean drug companies should get a blank check or that all innovation is good.The fundamental policy issues are how to encourage innovation, particularly high-value innovation, who should pay for innovation, and how much. Price discrimination across payers in the US (commercial payers pay more than many public payers) and across countries (those in the US pay more than those in other countries) have important distributional effects. Elimination of price discrimination may reduce innovation incentives, depending on the exact policy chosen, but many may be willing to trade some decrease in innovation for a more equitable distribution of the burden of financing that innovation.We need to find ways to get high-value innovations for less spending. One way to do that could be to reduce the amount of spending on drugs that goes to administering the complex system of managing access to drugs (eg, pharmacy benefit manager costs, administrative costs of copay assistance, utilization management) and does not go toward innovation. We cannot abolish these activities without a replacement because they counter the inflationary combination of patents and insurance. In fact, there is some evidence that they may help direct innovation toward high-value products. 7 Yet, the present approach is a very cumbersome way to encourage innovation.We have long known that markets for prescription drugs are, by design, not competitive, and the burden of financing innovation has disproportionately fallen on individuals in the US. Many have argued that we should not pay more than other countries for drugs, and Haque and colleagues 2 suggest that we should not pay more than our pets (and farm animals). Although distributional concerns may motivate a substantive amount of policy interest, the core focus should balance innovation incentives and spending. Policies that direct more drug spending toward innovators and high-value innovationsand less toward administration of prescription drug marketswill be important. Similarly, we must work to prevent anticompetitive behaviors that extend patents and dampen competition between patented, but therapeutically substitutable, products.