Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil

Figueiredo, Argelina Cheibub; Limongi, Fernando

doi:10.2307/422395

Cited by 372 publications

(202 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Although each method has its advantage or disadvantages, in our cases the results we obtained are highly Stjernquist and Bjurulf 1970;Clausen and Holmberg 1977;Saalfeld 1990;Myagkov and Kiewiet 1996;Lanfranchi and Lüthi 1999;Skjaeveland 1999Skjaeveland , 2001Noury 1999;Rasch 1999;Cox et al 2000;Figueiredo and others, and some periods being dominated by particular nationally-specific issues. The number of roll-call votes also varies across country, which is in part related to the rules governing what issues get to a vote.…”

Section: Estimation Of the Voting Space In 16 Legislaturesmentioning

confidence: 83%

Government-Opposition or Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures

Hix¹,

Noury²

2015

PSRM

101

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We use roll-call voting data from 16 legislatures to investigate how the institutional context of politics -such as whether a country is a parliamentary or presidential regime, or has a single-party, coalition or minority government -shapes coalition formation and voting behaviour in parliaments. We use a geometric scaling metric to estimate the 'revealed space' in each of these legislatures and a vote-by-vote statistical analysis to identify how much of this space can be explained by government-opposition dynamics as opposed to (leftright) policy positions of parties. We find that government-opposition interests rather than parties' policy positions are the main drivers of voting behaviour in most institutional contexts. In contrast, we find that issue-by-issue coalition-building along a single policy dimension only exists under restrictive institutional constraints; namely presidential regimes with coalition governments or parliamentary systems with minority governments. Put another way, voting in most legislatives is more like Westminster than Washington, DC.

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Section: Estimation Of the Voting Space In 16 Legislaturesmentioning

confidence: 83%

Government-Opposition or Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures

Hix¹,

Noury²

2015

PSRM

101

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“…Following the Constitution of 1988, however, all Presidents have been able to build reasonably stable post-electoral government coalitions by means of several discipline devices, such as veto power on the main issues, special prerogatives on budget allocation-including federal transfers-and the strong power of the leaderships of the coalition parties (see Figueiredo and Limongi, 2000;Pereira and Mueller, 2002).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil

2012

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. This paper uses a quasi-experimental strategy to disclose utterly political reasons behind the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We apply a regression discontinuity design in close elections to identify the effect of political alignment on federal transfers to municipal governments in Brazil. We find that municipalities where the mayor is affiliated with the coalition of the Brazilian President receive larger (discretionary) infrastructure transfers by about 40% in pre-election years. This effect is mainly driven by the fact that the federal government penalizes municipalities run by mayors from the opposition coalition who won by a narrow margin, thereby tying their hands for the next election.JEL Classification: C21, D72, H77

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“…Conforme discutimos em outros artigos (Figueiredo e Limongi, 2002;, as decisões que realmente afetam -ou podem afetar -o perfil do orçamento são tomadas pelo relator geral e pelos relatores adjuntos. Isto é, a apreciação congressual do orçamento é altamente centralizada e segue linhas partidárias.…”

Section: Execução Orçamentária E Preferências Políticasunclassified

“…No que se refere especificamente ao orçamento, essa relação implica, em primeiro lugar, a aceitação da centralização da condução do processo orçamentário na sua fase congressual. Há uma delegação de poder das bases para as lideranças partidárias, representadas, nesse caso, pelo relator geral e seus colaboradores diretos (Figueiredo e Limongi, 2002;.…”

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Processo orçamentário e comportamento Legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao Executivo e programas de governo

Limongi

Figueiredo

2005

Dados

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INTRODUÇÃON as análises das relações entre o Executivo e o Legislativo, a prerrogativa congressual de emendar o orçamento tem um papel de destaque. Essa prerrogativa resumir-se-ia, a se crer nessas análises, às emendas individuais. Não é difícil compreender a atração que esse aspecto do processo orçamentário exerce sobre os analistas: as emendas individuais permitem resgatar elementos cruciais das interpretações correntes acerca do modus operandi do sistema político brasileiro. Forneceriam, sobretudo, as evidências necessárias de que esse sistema se alicerça no individualismo dos políticos, dando lugar a uma distribuição clientelística e localista dos recursos públicos.Essas emendas seriam as engrenagens centrais de um complexo sistema de trocas de apoio que garantiria, na arena legislativa, o apoio "da 737 *O texto que deu origem a este artigo foi preparado para o 4º Encontro Nacional da Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política, realizado no Rio de Janeiro, de 21 a 24 de julho de 2004. As modificações feitas posteriormente se beneficiaram de comentários do debatedor, Octavio Amorim Neto, e dos participantes da reunião em que foi apresentado naquela ocasião, assim como dos pareceristas da revista Dados. Este trabalho, que conta com o financiamento da Fundação Konrad Adenauer e da Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo -FAPESP, é parte de um livro em elaboração que trata da participação do Congresso no processo orçamentário. Queremos deixar claro que se trata do estudo de um aspecto específico de um processo mais amplo e complexo cujo tratamento não pode ser feito nos limites de um artigo.

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Presidential Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil

Cited by 372 publications

References 8 publications

Government-Opposition or Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures

Government-Opposition or Left-Right? The Institutional Determinants of Voting in Legislatures

Tying Your Enemy's Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil

Processo orçamentário e comportamento Legislativo: emendas individuais, apoio ao Executivo e programas de governo

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