Predictive brains, dreaming selves, sleeping bodies: how the analysis of dream movement can inform a theory of self- and world-simulation in dreams

Windt, Jennifer M.

doi:10.1007/s11229-017-1525-6

Cited by 38 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 108 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Interestingly, independently of tDCS, our data suggest that while dream movements were very common, other bodily sensations such as somatosensory sensations, vestibular sensations or body schema alterations were rather rare. This overall pattern of frequent dream movement coupled with rare reports of other bodily sensations has been found in previous studies (Hobson 1988; Schwartz 2000; Windt 2018). Our study extends the previous work based on spontaneous dream reports by showing that when different types of bodily experiences are specifically investigated through use of a questionnaire, movements and tactile sensations remain the predominant dimensions of bodily experience in dreams.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

“…It is commonly thought that dream experience, including bodily experience, is completely independent of outward muscular activity and stimulation of the physical body. However, there are empirical and theoretical reasons for thinking that varying degrees of concordance between dream experience and the physical body exist, on both the levels of sensory input and motor output (Windt et al 2016; Windt 2018). Lesion studies in cats have shown that pontine lesions, which eliminate REM-sleep related muscular atonia, induce organized motor behavior, such as searching and attacking, during REM sleep (Henley and Morrison 1974; Sastre and Jouvet 1979), possibly indicating dream behaviours.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the same time, subtle muscular activity in the form of twitching is frequent in REM sleep and may play a role in the development and maintenance of motor behaviour (Blumberg 2015). A relation to dreaming seems plausible, but remains incompletely understood (Windt 2018).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Modulating dream experience: Noninvasive brain stimulation over the sensorimotor cortex reduces dream movement

Noreika

Windt

Kern

et al. 2019

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

27Recently, cortical correlates of specific dream contents have been reported, such as the 28 activation of the sensorimotor cortex during dreamed hand clenching. Yet, the causal 29 mechanisms underlying specific dream content remain largely elusive. Here, we investigated 30 how alterations in the excitability of sensorimotor areas through transcranial direct current 31 stimulation (tDCS) might alter dream content. Following bihemispheric tDCS or sham 32 stimulation, participants who were awakened from REM sleep filled out a questionnaire on 33 bodily sensations in dreams. tDCS, compared to sham stimulation, significantly decreased 34 reports of dream movement, especially repetitive actions. Contrary to this, other types of 35 bodily experiences, such as tactile or vestibular sensations, were not affected by tDCS, 36 confirming the specificity of stimulation effects. In addition, tDCS reduced interhemispheric 37 coherence in parietal areas and altered the phasic electromyography correlation between the 38 two arms. These findings reveal that a complex reorganization of the motor network co-39 occurred with the reduction of dream movement, confirming spatial specificity of the 40 stimulation site. We conclude that tDCS over the sensorimotor cortex causally interferes with 41 dream movement during REM sleep.42 43

show abstract

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Modulating dream experience: Noninvasive brain stimulation over the sensorimotor cortex reduces dream movement

Noreika

Windt

Kern

et al. 2019

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Sensations from the sleeping body, including sensory feedback from muscular activity but also, for instance, sounds can shape ongoing dream experience. Taken together this challenges the classical description of sleep, and especially of REM sleep/dreaming, as a state in which behavioral responsiveness is uniformly lost and the mind is essentially left to its own devices, cut off from perception of and interaction with the external world (Windt, 2017).…”

Section: Simulation and Beyond: From Dreaming To Dreamless Sleep Exmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness in sleep: How findings from sleep and dream research challenge our understanding of sleep, waking, and consciousness

Windt

2020

Philosophy Compass

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Sleep is phenomenologically rich, teeming with different kinds of conscious thought and experience. Dreaming is the most prominent example, but there is more to conscious experience in sleep than dreaming. Especially in non‐rapid eye movement sleep, conscious experience, sometimes dreamful, sometimes dreamless, also alternates with a loss of consciousness. Yet while dreaming has become established as a topic for interdisciplinary consciousness science and empirically informed philosophy of mind, the same is not true of other kinds of sleep‐related experience, nor is it true of sleep itself. I argue that this is a mistake. Conscious experience in sleep is more diverse than dreaming and we need to explain its different forms as well as the alternation between conscious and unconscious sleep states. We also need to ask how different kinds of sleep‐related experience relate to foundational issues about sleep and wakefulness as well as sleep stages. I survey recent findings and theoretical developments from sleep and dream research to show how the traditional view of sleep and its relation to wakefulness and consciousness is flawed. I then suggest that by refining our frameworks of sleep‐related experiences and sleep staging in tandem, we can work toward a better view. As we are only beginning to understand the diversity of consciousness in sleep, an important aim is programmatic: We need a philosophy of sleep and of consciousness in sleep, not just a philosophy of dreaming, and a future theory of sleep needs to integrate phenomenological considerations with neuroscientific and behavioral evidence. Working toward such a theory will radically transform our understanding of sleep, wakefulness, and our conscious minds.

show abstract

“…There is little agreement on what the experience of dreaming is like from a first‐person perspective. Theorists debate whether dreams are imaginations (Ichikawa, , ; Sosa & Ichikawa, ) illusions (Windt, , ), hallucinations (Hobson, Hong, & Friston, ; Metzinger, ; Revonsuo, Tuominen, & Valli, ) or an amalgam of these states (Rosen, ). Problems with describing the nature of dream experiences have a corresponding problem with operationalising dreams.…”

Section: Difficult Casesmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to operationalise consciousness

Carruthers

Carls-Diamante²,

Huang³

et al. 2019

Australian Journal of Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Objective: To review the way consciousness is operationalised in contemporary research, discuss strengths and weaknesses of current approaches and propose new measures. Method: We first reviewed the literature pertaining to the phenomenal character of visual and self-consciousness as well as awareness of visual stimuli. We also reviewed more problematic cases of dreams and animal consciousness, specifically that of octopuses. Results: Despite controversies, work in visual and self-consciousness is highly developed and there are notable successes. Cases where experiences are not induced, such as dreams, and where no verbal report is possible, such as when we study purported experiences of octopuses, are more challenging. It is difficult to be confident about the reliability and validity of operationalisations of dreams.Although this is a general concern about the measuring consciousness, it is not a sufficiently severe concern to completely undermine the work reviewed on vision and self-consciousness. It is more difficult to see how the good work on human psychology can be applied to non-human animals, especially those with radically different nervous systems, such as octopuses. Given the limitations of report-based operationalisations of consciousness, it is desirable to develop non-report-based measures, particularly for phenomenal qualities. We examine a number of possibilities and offer two possible approaches of varying degrees of practicality, the first based on combining quality space descriptions of phenomenal qualities and the notion of a "neural activation space" inherited from connectionist A.I., the second being a novel match to target approach. Conclusion: Consciousness is a multi-faceted phenomenon and requires a variety of operationalisations to be studied.

show abstract

Predictive brains, dreaming selves, sleeping bodies: how the analysis of dream movement can inform a theory of self- and world-simulation in dreams

Cited by 38 publications

References 108 publications

Modulating dream experience: Noninvasive brain stimulation over the sensorimotor cortex reduces dream movement

Modulating dream experience: Noninvasive brain stimulation over the sensorimotor cortex reduces dream movement

Consciousness in sleep: How findings from sleep and dream research challenge our understanding of sleep, waking, and consciousness

How to operationalise consciousness

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About