Power delegation and the European Central Bank's democratic deficit

Aziz, Nazli

doi:10.1007/s10308-005-0018-2

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(21 reference statements)

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“…In addition to their potentially uncertain profitability (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), these specific investments can generate such high development and control costs for the company that shareholders would be compelled to keep the current manager in place since his dismissal would result in high transaction costs either to continue, reduce or stop them (Williamson, 1985). Nazli (2005) argues that delegation involves both costs and benefits, because in some cases, the principal and agent may have divergent opinions and interests, which can lead to conflict. If there are conflicts between the principal and agent, the cost is higher because the focus will now be on conflict resolution.…”

Section: The Agency Relationship: the Essence Of Delegated Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Delegation of Managerial Power: A Modern Lever for Participative Management in Cameroonian SMEs

Mbaduet

2023

JMS

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The main aim of this study is to highlight how the manager transfers her power to a company employee, whether close to the management board or not, to carry out a certain number of tasks on her behalf. An analysis of the literature revealed that, on the one hand, the delegation of power is a form of participative management that has a more or less harmful influence on the company and certain stakeholders. On the other hand, it has been shown that the delegation of power engenders an agency relationship that is a source of conflicts of interest between the delegator and the delegatee, due to non-compliance with contractual clauses or the opportunism of the delegatee, who may use any means at his disposal to definitively oust the delegator and remain in his new position for a long time. This practice does exist within companies in Cameroon, although it is not clearly defined by OHADA law.

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Section: The Agency Relationship: the Essence Of Delegated Authoritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Delegation of Managerial Power: A Modern Lever for Participative Management in Cameroonian SMEs

Mbaduet

2023

JMS

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“…Ciccarone & Marchetti (2012) reveal the fact that in cases in which uncertainty is reflected in central bank's degree of conservativeness, the incentive contracts do not eliminate the inflation bias which may be positive or negative. According to Aziz, "the independence of the ECB to carry out its' tasks should not be pictured as the failure of democracy system in the EU to impose any type of ex ante commitment over the parameters of monetary management (Aziz, 2005, pp.545). Other authors like Campoy and Negrete (2008, pp.197) suggest that: "central bank independence is a well-known remedy to the inflation bias arising when a timeinconsistency problem of discretionary monetary policy is present…if principals cooperate, the inflation bias is eliminated when their output target is different but not when they disagree over the inflation objective".…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modelling Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Deus Ex Machina?

Dumiter

Brezeanu

Radu

et al. 2015

Studia Universitatis „Vasile Goldis” Arad – Economics Series

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Central bank independence represents the core element of assessing the complex relationship between government and central bank, having at background the fundamental issue of a free monetary policy decision-making process from the hands of the political circle. However, central bank independence is a multilevel concept within some social, economic and behavioral implications both for the central banks and for the society at whole. Central bank independence is needed in order to establish an autonomous central bank with a high degree of freedom in choosing its' instruments, objectives, techniques and tactics. Moreover, a high degree of transparency for the public disclosure and monitoring of central bank operation and transaction is needed for the social barometer of the central bank. Consequently the central bank must have a high degree of accountability and responsibility vis -á -vis of the most democratic institution, i.e. Parliament. In this article it is presented a comprehensive study regarding the complex relationship between central bank independence and inflation by modeling these two monetary policy panacea, in order to make a fine tuning regarding the causal relationship established in a heterodox manner.

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Die Immunisierung der Krisenverarbeitung in der Eurozone

Lüggert¹

2017

Die Grenzen Der Demokratie

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Power delegation and the European Central Bank's democratic deficit

Cited by 4 publications

References 29 publications

Delegation of Managerial Power: A Modern Lever for Participative Management in Cameroonian SMEs

Delegation of Managerial Power: A Modern Lever for Participative Management in Cameroonian SMEs

Modelling Central Bank Independence and Inflation: Deus Ex Machina?

Die Immunisierung der Krisenverarbeitung in der Eurozone

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