Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games

“…faced by trustees to be different from that faced by dictators even though the trustees made their choices without knowing the choice of the trustor (which differs from the conjecture by McCabe et al, 2003). Given the results of Cason and Casari (2009), we would expect that our results would be further strengthened if trustees made their choice after observing the choice of the trustors.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 64%

“…Only subject D (the dictator) has an effective choice in this game and has to decide the amount x D to give to subject C out of twenty. The games T * and D * may also be thought of as voluntary and involuntary trust games, respectively (McCabe et al, 2003;Smith, 2003). The action set faced by a trustee in game T * is identical to the action set faced by a dictator in game D * .…”

Section: Tradeoffs In Experimental Designsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity

Levati

Miettinen

Rai

2011

Journal of Economic Psychology

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract. The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter's and the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely affect the interpretation of data from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs (between-subjects and within-subjects) used to conduct experiments may fail to sufficiently account for this concern. An alternative design for laboratory experiments is proposed which may alleviate this concern especially in studies of social preferences. The proposed design is used to answer some questions that have attracted continued attention in the literature on social preferences in general and reciprocity in particular. Terms of use: Documents in

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“…These variables are used as additional controls in the regressions, as well as for providing descriptive statistics. In order to account for the "kindness effect" (McCabe, Rigdon and Smith, 2003), when analyzing the amounts passed back by players of type B, also the received amount is used as control together with the other relevant variables.…”

Section: Methodology and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Socialisation, trust and reciprocity among young people

Migheli

2012

Swiss J Economics Statistics

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Summary This paper analyzes the contribution of youth’s different time allocations to positive behaviors in exchanges. Psychologists highlight that time spent within voluntary organizations fosters positive development. The paper aims at deepening the knowledge of the psychological bases of the observed outcomes of a basic trust game. Undergraduate students played a basic trust game; after this, information about the use of their spare time was collected. Higher passed amounts positively correlate with time spent in youth organizations. The main novelties of the paper are: the way social capital is measured and the strong link with the psychological literature.

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Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games

Cited by 535 publications

References 13 publications

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

Punish or perish? Retaliation and collaboration among humans

Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments: The case of reciprocity

Socialisation, trust and reciprocity among young people

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