Populist Juggling with Fear: The Case of Hungary

Abstract

In this article, the interrelatedness of contemporary populism and fear is analysed. It is argued that contemporary populism is burdened with the uncertainties and contingencies of late modernity. Therefore, it is not capable of merely “instrumentalizing” fear (i.e., relying on fear as an instrument of ideological goals). Instead, populism is forced to “juggle” with fear in a continuously changing, unpredictable constellation. In the first section, the ideal type of instrumentalizing fear is introduced. In the second section, this ideal type is developed into the model of juggling with fear based on theories of late modernity: the impact of the narrowing of political agency, the reconfiguration of the public sphere, and the interiorization of uncertainty are analysed. In the third section, this ideal type is further explored through a case study of illiberal Hungary: the empirical patterns of juggling with quotidian and virtual fears reveal the micro-mechanisms and the broader consequences.

Possibilities and limits of political humour in a hybrid regime

“…Over the years, the governing party, Fidesz, has mastered a dramatic political style that relies on simplification, antagonism and creating new enemies through fearmongering (see, e.g. Palonen, 2018;Sik, 2023). While such a style can be viewed on its own as a specific type of political communication or strategy, in the hands of a corrupt party (Scheiring, 2018) that largely controls the TV channels and newspapers it has had a profound impact on how Hungarians see the world around them (see, e.g.…”

“…Fidesz employs a range of unconventional methods to spread the party's messages and justify its policies. The government regularly organises national consultations with leading questions, accompanied by massive billboard and poster campaigns, making it impossible not to know what kinds of answers are expected (see Batory & Svensson, 2019;Oross & Tap, 2021;Kallius & Adriaans, 2022;Sik, 2023). The consultations usually garner a response rate of approximately 10-20 per cent and are often then followed by another round of billboard campaigns boasting about the enormous level of support for the government's policies.…”

“…The fragmentation of Hungarian society (e.g. Sik, 2023) and the deterioration of democracy (see, e.g. Ágh, 2016;Bozóki & Hegedűs, 2018) has resulted in subaltern counterpublics (Fraser, 1990;Nagy, 2016), or sphericules (Gitlin, 1998).…”

“…The defining element of the dominant Hungarian public sphere is generating and promoting fear (Barát, 2017;Sik, 2023). Sik claims that for the populist right-wing party Fidesz, it is not enough just to instrumentalise fear; instead, "they rebuild the whole public sphere around virtual fears while juggling with them" (2023, p. 3).…”

“…Sik claims that for the populist right-wing party Fidesz, it is not enough just to instrumentalise fear; instead, "they rebuild the whole public sphere around virtual fears while juggling with them" (2023, p. 3). According to Sik (2023), this results in a situation where fears are no longer generated in relation to certain values or ideology, but only according to their effectiveness in influencing people and their behaviours. As such, fear becomes a goal in itself.…”