Political Regimes, Bureaucracy, and Scientific Productivity

Abstract

Can a scientist trust that the government is going to pay him or her fairly? In the science–government relationship, an incumbent may be better off if he or she does not provide—or does not provide a fair pay to public scientists. We propose a simple game‐theoretic model for understanding the trust problem in the relationship between governments and scientists. The model shows how with reliable governments (democracies), bureaucratic contracts (e.g., secure tenure) are not optimal since they have low‐powered incentives (in contrast to the high‐powered private‐sector type of contracts) and run against scientists' responsiveness to government demands. However, with nonreliable governments (dictatorships), bureaucratic contracts are second‐best solutions because they protect scientists against the possibility of governments' misbehavior (i.e., ex post opportunistic defections, such as canceling research programs overnight). An empirical analysis confirms the predictions: bureaucratic contracts enhance scientific productivity with nonreliable governments (dictatorships) but hamper scientific productivity with reliable governments (democracies).

What is a scientific article? A principal-agent explanation

“…The principal can choose to monitor the agent at a cost or set a payoff rule that brings both parties’ interests into line. In a one-time agreement, the principal fears that the agent will attempt to make less of an effort, a low-quality effort, or no effort at all for the same compensation; conversely, the agent fears the principal will pay less than the amount agreed to for the work done, or nothing at all (Fernández-Carro, 2007; Lapuente and Fernández-Carro, 2008). In a repeated agreement, both parties can benefit from the extended relationship, but this is known to be unstable.…”