1987
DOI: 10.2307/975472
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Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century

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Cited by 81 publications
(48 citation statements)
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“…In addition, we argue that the more financing is linked with the global capital and exchange markets, the more investors will seek foreign financial exits. Consequently, foreignfinanced VCs will push firms into business models that aim at either going public on the (Bowsher 1991;Deri 1993;Heclo 1977;Pfiffner 1992 For many years the Irish development agencies followed the ideal-type Weberian structure with internal recruiting, training, and career development procedures. However, they did so with an English flavor, including a strong distinction between the socialscience-humanity-law "general-educated" employees who are being groomed to management, and the technical-engineering "expert-educated" personnel whose career does not lead them to high management positions (Rose 1981;Rose 1986 important not only to explain the difference between success and failure, but also to explain the reasons behind the specific choices made.…”
Section: A New Model Of Rib Industrialization Politicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In addition, we argue that the more financing is linked with the global capital and exchange markets, the more investors will seek foreign financial exits. Consequently, foreignfinanced VCs will push firms into business models that aim at either going public on the (Bowsher 1991;Deri 1993;Heclo 1977;Pfiffner 1992 For many years the Irish development agencies followed the ideal-type Weberian structure with internal recruiting, training, and career development procedures. However, they did so with an English flavor, including a strong distinction between the socialscience-humanity-law "general-educated" employees who are being groomed to management, and the technical-engineering "expert-educated" personnel whose career does not lead them to high management positions (Rose 1981;Rose 1986 important not only to explain the difference between success and failure, but also to explain the reasons behind the specific choices made.…”
Section: A New Model Of Rib Industrialization Politicsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The literatures in public administration and political science are replete with accounts of how the relationship between elected officials and public administrators can become stressed, tense, and conflict-laden (e.g., Lorentzen, 1985;Pfiffner, 1987;Hubbell, 1991;Ingraham et al, 1995). This is very likely for the simple reason that the two actors have different formal positions, values, and perspectives (e.g., Svara, 2001).…”
Section: Interaction Quality: Whymentioning
confidence: 96%
“…Some scholars have substantiated the politicization of the bureaucracy by pointing to the overall growth of political appointees since the creation of the EOP (Pfiffner, 1987;Maranto 1993;Light, 1995;Durant and Warber, 2001;Dickinson, 2005): while employment in the federal bureaucracy may have decreased, the tendency towards EOP staff growth has been consistent since the 1940s-and and as the EOP is the backbone of the presidential center, then EOP staff growth would signal an increase in political appointees and therefore an increase in politicization of the bureaucracy. Others scholars have shown that appointment techniques enable presidents to politicize not merely the managerial level, but also the policy development, implementation and support levels of agencies (Campbell, 2005;Lewis, 2005Lewis, , 2008: presidents can replace top managers, create layers of politically appointed managers with authority over career managers, add appointed ministerial staff with no statutory authority but political influence over career managers, reorganize agencies to diminish the power of career bureaucrats, and/or impose reductions on the workforce which eliminate career posts and thus increase the power of appointees (Lewis 2008: pp.…”
Section: Overviewmentioning
confidence: 99%