Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence

Sherman, Lawrence W.

doi:10.1086/449163

Cited by 367 publications

(410 citation statements)

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“…Within this framework, the decision to commit crime is heavily affected by one prominent factor: the individual's perceived risk of apprehension (Loughran et al 2011;Nagin 1998Nagin , 2013a. Perception of this risk was found to be highly influenced by proximate variables, including objective sanction risks (Apel 2013), and among these objective risks, police presence is an important ecological cue that inhibits criminal conduct (Golub et al 2003;Sherman 1990). But we remain entirely unclear about how much the presence of police doing what, has how much effect, for how long.…”

Section: The Deterrent Effect Of Policingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Soft” policing at hot spots—do police community support officers work? A randomized controlled trial

2016

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Objectives To determine whether crime-reduction effects of increased police patrols in hot spots are dependent on the Bhard^threat of immediate physical arrest, or whether Bsoft^patrols by civilian (but uniformed) police staff with few arrest powers and no weapons can also reduce crime. We also sought to assess whether the number of discrete patrol visits to a hot spot was more or less important than the total minutes of police presence across all visits, and whether effects based on counts of crime would be consistent with effects on a Crime Harm Index outcome. Methods We randomly assigned 72 hot spots into 34 treatment units and 38 controls. Treatment consisted of increases in foot patrol by uniformed, unarmed, Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) who carry no weapons and hold few arrest powers beyond those of ordinary citizens. GPS-trackers on every PCSO and Constable in the city yielded precise measurements of all patrol time in all hot spots. Standardized mean differences (Cohen's d), OLS regression model, and Weighted Displacement Quotient are used to assess main effects, to model the interaction effect of GPS data with treatment, and to measure the diffusion-of-benefits of the intervention, respectively. Outcomes included counts of incidents as well as the Cambridge Crime Harm Index. Results As intended, patrol visits and minutes by Police Constables were equal across the treatment and control groups. The sole difference in policing between the treatments groups was in visits to the hot spots by PCSOs, in both the mean daily frequency of discrete visits (T = 4.65, C = 2.66; p ≤ .001) and total minutes across all visits (T = 37.41, J Exp Criminol (2016) 12:277-317 DOI 10.1007/s11292-016-9260-

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Section: The Deterrent Effect Of Policingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“Soft” policing at hot spots—do police community support officers work? A randomized controlled trial

2016

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“…Five studies used rational choice theory and / or routine activity theory to describe the effects of formal surveillance. The study of Copper et al [24] on the other hand used the crackdown theory [25] to explain the impact of police deployment. In the other four Studies have called a theory.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Untitled

2015

FRCIJ

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Research Article Introduction A Systematic Review of Displacement and Diffusion Effects of Crime Through Formal SurveillanceFrom the nineties, CCTV deployed in public areas [1]. Since then, several studies have calculated that in London at least hang half a million video cameras [1]. This is roughly equivalent to an average of one camera for every fifteen people. Not only in London was from the nineties to see an increase in the number of cameras, but also in major cities in countries such as France and Spain [2]. Camera surveillance is an example of formal surveillance, as well as for police patrols and alarm systems [3,4]. According Weisburd et al. [5], there is increasing evidence that various forms of formal surveillance impact in crime in and around the area of the intervention. For example, the risk that crime and nuisance move to areas with no intervention, in the sense of formal surveillance is present.The objective of formal surveillance is deterring offenders and potential offenders. This formal surveillance is accomplished through the use of actors who are primarily responsible for security, such as police officers and other security personnel. The introduction of technology, the above-mentioned actors helped or even replaced. For this reason, it is also to be placed under the term formal surveillance [6,7]. According to the rational choice theory [8] are offenders by committing formal surveillance deter crime. This theory states that because offenders and potential offenders weigh the costs and benefits of committing crime. The presence of formal surveillance increases the risk of getting caught. This increased risk of being caught, the costs are also increased, making the cost-benefit analysis is less favorable.Another criminological theory consistent with the deterrent effect of formal surveillance is routine activity theory of Cohen & Felson [9]. According to routine activity theory, the probability that a crime is committed greater when meet the following three conditions: lack of oversight, a motivated offender and suitable target [10]. Sets the theory implied that if (formal) supervision is present in a public space, this deters offenders and potential offenders. With a public space, as in the article of Welsh Mudge & Farrington [11], a space meant that one can make use of unencumbered and accessible for basically every citizen. The above criminological theories as Bernasco et al. [12] compatible with the theory of situational crime prevention Clarke [13]. This approach to prevention focuses on the potential target of a perpetrator. This target should be protected by formal surveillance which increases the probability of detection of the perpetrator.However itself, a number of situations occur when formal surveillance increases in a particular area, to ensure that formal surveillance not always lead to a reduction in overall crime. These situations indicate that crime in different ways can be moved as a result of an increase in formal surveillance in an area [14]. Repetto TA [15] outlined five...

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“…La diffusion des bénéfices d'une mesure de prévention ou de protection s'explique par deux mécanismes. Premièrement, l'effet dissuasif situationnel tend à débor-der l'aire où il s'exerce parce que les délinquants potentiels ne savent pas très bien distinguer les secteurs protégés de ceux qui ne le sont pas (Sherman, 1990;Scherdin, 1992;. Deuxièmement, une initiative de prévention le moindrement efficace raréfie les cibles susceptibles d'intéresser les délinquants dans un secteur.…”

Section: Les Causes De La Richesse Et De La Sécurité Des Nationsunclassified

“…Ceux de la période contemporaine n'en existent pas moins. C'est ainsi que plusieurs succès ponctuels ont été obtenus grâce à des mesures de prévention (Clarke, éd., 1992) ou par des opérations policières bien ciblées (Sherman, 1990(Sherman, , 1992Homel, 1992).…”

Section: -La Décroissance De La Violenceunclassified

L’effet structurant du contrôle social

Cusson¹

2005

crimino

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The paper deals with the following question. To what extent do the human efforts at controlling crime succeed ? It starts by proposing an enlarged concept of social control. In the second part, a theory of choices made by offenders under the constraint of social control is put forward. In the last part, it is argued that social control can have four types of impacts :I — reducing the frequency of crime; 2 — reducing its severity; 3 — rendering obsolete some criminal tactics and stimulating the development of new ones; and, 4 — channeling offenders toward vulnerable targets. It is concluded that crime is shaped by the means used to control it, meaning that a given state of crime rates should be seen as the result of what people decide to do and not to do about crime

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Police Crackdowns: Initial and Residual Deterrence

Cited by 367 publications

References 0 publications

“Soft” policing at hot spots—do police community support officers work? A randomized controlled trial

“Soft” policing at hot spots—do police community support officers work? A randomized controlled trial

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L’effet structurant du contrôle social

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