Philadelphia reconsidered: participant curation, the Gerry Committee, and US constitutional design

Abstract

Legislative design was a critical question at the 1787 Constitutional Convention. The peculiar compromise that was struck-featuring proportional and republican elements-defies the logic of the Convention's majority rule. We investigate how in establishing the new national legislature, small state delegates were able to prevail over the large state majority and secure the Connecticut Compromise. We argue that the small state coalition's victory owes to their strategy at a critical juncture: the Gerry Committee. The Gerry Committee amplified the contours of the debate over legislative design and the careful curation of its participants precipitated a shift of structural and creative freedom allowing for the consideration of alternative solutions. The Committee produced an environment favorable to a compromise on legislative structure and power by manipulating the policy dimensions connecting representation, taxation, and slavery. Participant curation was essential in allowing political opponents-the small states-to overcome unfavorable conditions, maximize utility, and craft a proposal capable of approval by delegates and eventual constitutional ratification.

The Effects of the Great Compromise on the Constitutional Convention of 1787

“…North Carolina then switched sides, not because of a compromise, but because the convention added direct taxation to the Three-Fifths Clause. Similarly, Phillips et al (2022) argue that a committee largely made up of small states helped promote small state interests and was pivotal in producing the eventual compromise.…”