Perception and Cognition Are Largely Independent, but Still Affect Each Other in Systematic Ways: Arguments from Evolution and the Consciousness-Attention Dissociation

Montemayor, Carlos; Haladjian, Harry Haroutioun

doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00040

Cited by 34 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 74 publications

(95 reference statements)

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“…Coherence may therefore be assumed to be largely a perceptual issue. Yet, because perception of coherence does require memory too, i.e., about previously experienced natural motion, perception and cognition cannot be considered mutually exclusive concepts, but do show at least some overlap and interaction [30].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

In-car speed estimations with real, virtual, and no view

Bos

Berg-Kroon²,

Houben³

et al. 2019

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

In-car speed estimations with real, virtual, and no view

Bos

Berg-Kroon²,

Houben³

et al. 2019

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“…If the probabilistic process that determines the color I am seeing is red is specified by implicit inferences that are reliable enough to produce true belief, then such guidance is beneficial. But if the color I am seeing is determined by inferential influences that are pervasive and unreliable (for instance, I am more likely to see red when something looks like a tomato), cognitive penetration would spell disaster with respect to at least color perception (see Montemayor and Haladjian, 2017, for a critical discussion about the notion of cognitive penetration in the context of the functions of attention). Typically, the selective functions of attention routines are virtuously sensitive to reliable information—they tend to be epistemically adequate, because they ignore irrelevant information and are immune to frequent error by preventing an overwhelming influence of bias (see Fairweather and Montemayor, 2017, for the notion of “virtuous sensitivity”).…”

Section: Attention: High- and Low-level Inferential Cognition In Varimentioning

confidence: 99%

Inferential Integrity and Attention

Montemayor

2019

Front. Psychol.

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How should we define inferential reasoning in high-level cognition? Can non-conscious representations guide or even determine high-level cognition? If so, what are the properties of such non-conscious representations? Two contemporary debates on high-level cognition center on these issues. The first concerns the possibility of cognitive penetration, or the degree and extent to which high-level cognition influences or determines low-level cognition. The second focuses on the epistemic status of conscious cognition, and on whether or not non-conscious cognition could play a similar, albeit not as fundamental, justificatory role as conscious cognition. This latter issue is at the heart of the question concerning the epistemic status of conscious awareness. This paper focuses on the epistemic standard required for inference, or inferential reasoning, to count as justificatory. The debates on the epistemic status of consciousness and cognitive penetration typically assume such a standard because high-level cognition is associated with rationality, inferentially structured thought, and the epistemic responsibility one has for the conclusions drawn through one’s inferences. The paper proposes an account of inferential-attention that explains how cognitive penetration of non-phenomenally conscious cognition and perception is possible, and why there are unconscious processes that should be considered as essential components of high-level cognition. Sections “Defining Inference” and “Accuracy Constraints: The Agency-First Account of Inference” provide a theoretical framework for understanding the multiple criteria that an adequate account of inference and rational thought must satisfy. Sections “Attention: High- and Low-Level Inferential Cognition in Various Domains” and “Advantages Concerning Rule-Following and Rationality: Not Necessarily-Phenomenal Inferential Reasoning” articulate the inferential-attention account and explain how it meets the descriptive and normative criteria for epistemic responsibility and rationality. In particular, section “Attention: High- and Low-Level Inferential Cognition in Various Domains” defends an agential interpretation of inferential-attention, which offers a resolution of the tension between conservative or consciousness-based approaches to inference and liberal approaches that allow for types of unconscious or subdoxastic processes. An agency condition on inference explains how inference is a psychological process under the control of the agent, and at the same time, it satisfies the normative condition that an inference should be responsive to reasons or evidence by being cognitively available for personal level assessment and evaluation. The key is to identify this kind of epistemic agency with attention. Section “Advantages Concerning Rule-Following and Rationality: Not Necessarily-Phenomenal Inferential Reasoning” compares this inferential-attention account with an influential agential account of inference based on conscious intuition, and it argues that the former account is prefe...

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“…With language, humans acquired an enormously powerful format of representation, with syntacticrecursive functions that map onto a vast number of contents, and immense possibilities for communicative nuance. The influence of language does not affect the early forms of time perception, concerned with sensorial duration and simultaneity, but language has a powerful effect on our memories-incidentally, this might be the right way to interpret the scope of the Whorfian hypothesis, namely the claim that language determines thought (Montemayor, 2018b; see also Montemayor and Haladjian, 2017).…”

Section: Language Memory and Depersonalizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reality Monitoring and Autobiographical Memory: Negotiating the Self

Montemayor

2018

AOP

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The contemporary study of memory has greatly benefited from recent findings in neuroscience and psychology showing that memory is a highly flexible, contextualized and yet, reliable enough system, composed of different types of functions that overlap to provide an overall balance of accuracy and meaning. Although I discuss some of these findings, my main focus is on putting them into a larger perspective. Memory has been a very important issue in the humanities, literature, and the history of psychology. This paper discusses the importance of inner speech and narrative from a theoretical and historical perspective, interpreting contemporary findings in the light of previous theories of memory, consciousness, and the influence of language on both. Collective memory, different forms of reality monitoring, and the interaction between episodic and autobiographical memory are discussed. Previous views on the suppression and intrusion of memories are also analyzed.

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Perception and Cognition Are Largely Independent, but Still Affect Each Other in Systematic Ways: Arguments from Evolution and the Consciousness-Attention Dissociation

Cited by 34 publications

References 74 publications

In-car speed estimations with real, virtual, and no view

In-car speed estimations with real, virtual, and no view

Inferential Integrity and Attention

Reality Monitoring and Autobiographical Memory: Negotiating the Self

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