2013
DOI: 10.1177/1354068813509521
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Party loyalty and electoral dealignment

Abstract: Representative democracy is party democracy. Parties vote together in the legislative arena; party labels act as information shortcuts in the electoral arena, tying together co-partisan legislators’ re-election prospects. But the utility of party labels is weakened by waning party identifications in the electorate. Partisan dealignment therefore risks undercutting party loyalty on the part of backbenchers. Combining district-level data on electoral volatility and new data from the PARTIREP survey of legislator… Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(33 citation statements)
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References 45 publications
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“…Partisanship influences MPs' behavior in a number of ways. Firstly, parliamentary parties are to various extents hierarchically structured and impose the obligation to vote in accordance with party policy on individuals (André et al 2013;Detterbeck 2011). Such cases are only of limited suitability to picture predominance of identities.…”
Section: Organizational Identitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Partisanship influences MPs' behavior in a number of ways. Firstly, parliamentary parties are to various extents hierarchically structured and impose the obligation to vote in accordance with party policy on individuals (André et al 2013;Detterbeck 2011). Such cases are only of limited suitability to picture predominance of identities.…”
Section: Organizational Identitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Where recent work has explored dealignment's behavioural consequences in declining voting cohesion (André et al. ; Kam ), this article suggests it might also have institutional consequences, producing more decentralised legislative policy making.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…Dealignment has already been shown to have behavioural consequences for parliaments; several studies have linked it to an increase in legislators’ inclination to vote rebelliously (André et al. ; Kam ). However, existing work is yet to rigorously test whether it has also had institutional consequences…”
Section: Partisan Dealignment and Committee Powermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An individual MP is thus loyal when avoiding sanctions and/or when the preferences are in line with fellow partisans. This is easy when the main principal is the national party; when other interests conflict with the party line, MPs should consider potential repercussions for deviating from the party line – and the label under which they were elected (Andeweg and Thomassen, 2010; André et al, 2013). Rebellious MPs face the threat of being sanctioned by expulsion from the party, thereby possibly damaging future opportunities by not maintaining the label that got them elected.…”
Section: Defining Party Loyaltymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Party unity (and loyalty as one dimension of the latter) is generally expected to be higher under proportional representation than plurality electoral systems (Bowler et al, 1999; Cain et al, 1987; Mayhew, 1974) in the list tier of mixed-member systems (Heitshusen et al, 2005; Herron, 2002; Kerevel, 2010; Sieberer, 2010). Additional work encompasses the electoral system with partisan de-alignment (André et al, 2013) or the election year and issue salience (Traber et al, 2014). Others emphasise the effect of closed versus open list ballot structures and intraparty competition (Carey and Shugart, 1995), and re-selection and centralised party control over nomination procedures (Rahat and Hazan, 2001; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008) at the pre-election stage.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%