Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts

Abbink, Klaus; Brandts, Jordi; Herrmann, Benedikt; Orzen, Henrik

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.083

Cited by 103 publications

(89 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Individuals, after they see their group members' contributions, can execute a punishment that is costly to themselves, but more costly to the punished group member or members (13,19,(36)(37)(38)(39). Experiments have shown that individuals punish to motivate others to contribute more and that individuals respond to (the threat of) punishment by increasing subsequent contributions in public good provision (36)(37)(38)(39) and intergroup contests (13,18,19). Accordingly, Exp.…”

Section: Methods Summarymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That intergroup conflict elicits self-sacrificial contributions to one's group's fighting capacity has been robustly revealed in experiments using N-person (intergroup) prisoner's dilemma (4,5,(15)(16)(17) or price-contest games (18)(19)(20)(21). What cannot be derived from these setups, however, is whether individuals selfsacrifice to (i) defend their in-group against out-group aggression; (ii) to aggressively exploit and subordinate the out-group; or (iii) because of some combination of both reasons (5,9,10,22,23).…”

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confidence: 99%

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In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict

Dreu

Gross

Méder

et al. 2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

120

144

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Intergroup conflict persists when and because individuals make costly contributions to their group's fighting capacity, but how groups organize contributions into effective collective action remains poorly understood. Here we distinguish between contributions aimed at subordinating out-groups (out-group aggression) from those aimed at defending the in-group against possible out-group aggression (in-group defense). We conducted two experiments in which three-person aggressor groups confronted three-person defender groups in a multiround contest game (n = 276; 92 aggressor-defender contests). Individuals received an endowment from which they could contribute to their group's fighting capacity. Contributions were always wasted, but when the aggressor group's fighting capacity exceeded that of the defender group, the aggressor group acquired the defender group's remaining resources (otherwise, individuals on both sides were left with the remainders of their endowment). In-group defense appeared stronger and better coordinated than out-group aggression, and defender groups survived roughly 70% of the attacks. This low success rate for aggressor groups mirrored that of group-hunting predators such as wolves and chimpanzees (n = 1,382 cases), hostile takeovers in industry (n = 1,637 cases), and interstate conflicts (n = 2,586). Furthermore, whereas peer punishment increased out-group aggression more than in-group defense without affecting success rates (Exp. 1), sequential (vs. simultaneous) decision-making increased coordination of collective action for out-group aggression, doubling the aggressor's success rate (Exp. 2). The relatively high success rate of in-group defense suggests evolutionary and cultural pressures may have favored capacities for cooperation and coordination when the group goal is to defend, rather than to expand, dominate, and exploit.competition | parochial altruism | coordination | collective action | intergroup relations

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Section: Methods Summarymentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict

Dreu

Gross

Méder

et al. 2016

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

120

144

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Instead, it most likely incorporates different nonmonetary considerations, such as the non-monetary utility of winning (Sheremeta, 2010(Sheremeta, , 2013(Sheremeta, , 2015, status (Charness et al, 2013;Clingingsmith and Sheremeta, 2015), and recognition (Andreoni and Petrie, 2004;Samek and Sheremeta, 2014). Moreover, since our experiment is conducted at two different universities (Shenzhen University and University Town), group identity may also impact individual behavior in the all-pay auction (Chen and Li, 2009;Abbink et al, 2012;Cason et al, 2012;Halevy et al, 2012), especially when students from one university compete against students from another university. Our theoretical model considers both types of factors simultaneously.…”

Section: Theoretical Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When students from one university compete against students from another university, in addition to different values of winning ( ≠ ), we should expect more competitive behavior against students from another university ( > 0 and > 0) due to identity enhanced hostile behavior towards out-group members (Abbink et al, 2012;Cason et al, 2012;Halevy et al, 2012). In such a case, we have an all-pay auction between two asymmetric players (a student from Shenzhen University) and (a student from University Town).…”

Section: Theoretical Predictionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition between and within Universities: Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of Group Identity and the Desire to Win

2015

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We study how salient group identity, created through competition between students from different universities, as well as differences in the value of winning impact competitive behavior. Our experiment employs a simple all-pay auction within and between two university subject pools. We find that when competing against their peers, students within the lower tier university bid more aggressively than students within the top-tier university. Also, students from the lower tier university, in particular women, bid more aggressively when competing against students from the top-tier university. These findings, interpreted through a theoretical model incorporating both group identity and differential value of winning, suggest that students at the lower tier university have a stronger group identity as well as higher desire to win.

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“…2 can be found in other countries and historical episodes. 3 Violent con ‡ict between former alliance partners may be a frequent outcome, but it is not an automatism. The break-up of an alliance after victory may be avoidable and is, to a large extent, a matter of choice.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict

Konrad

Morath

2012

SSRN Journal

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Victorious alliances often …ght about the spoils of war. This paper presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and …ght internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of …ghting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal …ght reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make non-binding declarations on non-aggression in the relationship between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher di¤er-ences in the alliance players'contributions to alliance e¤ort lead to more internal con ‡ict and more intense …ghting.

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Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts

Cited by 103 publications

References 12 publications

In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict

In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict

Competition between and within Universities: Theoretical and Experimental Investigation of Group Identity and the Desire to Win

Alliances in the Shadow of Conflict

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