Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Pauly, Mark V.

doi:10.2307/1881793

Cited by 577 publications

(315 citation statements)

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“…people with wealth below the threshold will not leave a bequest 22 ; ii) marginal propensity to bequeath (MPB), i.e. the fraction of each additional dollar of wealth that will be bequeathed once bequest is operational.…”

Section: Bequest Form Parameter Valuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accounting for non-annuitization

Pashchenko

2013

Journal of Public Economics

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Why don't people buy annuities? Several explanations have been provided by the previous literature: large fraction of preannuitized wealth in retirees' portfolios; adverse selection; bequest motives; and medical expense uncertainty. This paper uses a quantitative model to assess the importance of these impediments to annuitization and also studies three newer explanations: government safety net in terms of means-tested transfers; illiquidity of housing wealth; and restrictions on minimum amount of investment in annuities. This paper shows that quantitatively four explanations play a big role in reducing annuity demand: preannuitized wealth, minimum annuity purchase requirement, illiquidity of housing wealth, and bequest motives. The annuity purchase involves big upfront investment, especially if there is a minimum purchase restriction. This is binding for many, especially if housing is illiquid and part of wealth is preannuitized. While bequest motives significantly reduce the overall annuity demand, the model with a strong bequest motive cannot match the empirical fact that high-income people have the highest demand for annuities.

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Section: Bequest Form Parameter Valuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accounting for non-annuitization

Pashchenko

2013

Journal of Public Economics

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“…Par ses activités de prévention l'assuré réduit son espérance mathématique de perte. Il s'agit donc d'un changement de premier ordre classique dans la littérature sur le risque moral (Holmstrom, 1979 ;Shavell, 1979;Pauly, 1974). De plus, nous supposons que l'assuré ne peut affecter le support de la distribution ce qui empêche le principal (ou l'assureur) de déterminer parfaitement l'action effectuée en observant les réalisations des états de la nature (Mirrless, 1976).…”

Section: Modèle Théorique De Comportement Optimal De L'assureurunclassified

Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l’assurance automobile (1992) au Québec

Dionne¹,

Vanasse

2009

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RÉSUMÉ Le but de cette recherche était d’évaluer l’effet du changement de tarification de 1992 sur la sécurité routière au Québec. Nos résultats indiquent que le changement de tarification a réduit les nombres d’infractions et les nombres d’accidents, deux variables qui mesurent indirectement la non-prévention routière. De plus, nos résultats indiquent que le nombre de points d’inaptitude accumulés au cours d’une période de deux ans est un bon prédicteur du nombre d’accidents de la période suivante de deux ans ce qui supporte la politique de tarification de la SAAQ. En effet, cette politique en plus d’inciter plus de prudence, fait payer des contributions d’assurance proportionnelles aux risques individuels. En d’autres termes, le changement de 1992 a réintroduit une tarification des risques plus équitable au sens actuariel en faisant payer aux risques élevés des contributions d’assurance plus élevées. Ces résultats ont été obtenus de l’estimation des paramètres de la loi de distribution binomiale négative avec effets aléatoires pour tenir compte de l’aspect panel des données.

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“…Essa é a parte do prejuízo sob responsabilidade do segurado. Este mecanismo reduz o problema do risco moral (fraude) (SPENCE e ZECKHAUSER, 1971;PAULY, 1974;NELSON e LOEHMAN, 1987;GOODWIN e SMITH, 1996;QUIGGIN et al, 1994;OZAKI, 2006a).…”

Section: O Seguro Agrícolaunclassified

Análise e quantificação do risco para a gestão eficiente do portfólio agrícola das seguradoras

Ozaki¹,

Dias²

2009

Rev. Econ. Sociol. Rural

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Resumo: A presença de eventos considerados catastróficos pode comprometer o balanço financeiro da carteira agrícola das seguradoras. Por exemplo, a estiagem pode afetar não somente um produtor, mas milhares de produtores em uma vasta extensão territorial. Para contornar esse problema, as seguradoras podem diversificar geograficamente suas operações. Nesse sentido este estudo aplica a análise de agrupamentos em um conjunto de dados de produtividade municipal de milho, no período de 1990 a 2005, para o estado do Paraná. Ao todo, 39 grupos foram formados conforme características similares de produtividade esperada e risco relativo. Para que as perdas sejam minimizadas, o estudo exclui alguns municípios de alto risco e sugere a classificação dos grupos, de acordo com o grau de risco relativo. Palavras

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Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Cited by 577 publications

References 0 publications

Accounting for non-annuitization

Accounting for non-annuitization

Une évaluation empirique de la nouvelle tarification de l’assurance automobile (1992) au Québec

Análise e quantificação do risco para a gestão eficiente do portfólio agrícola das seguradoras

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