Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of e-Standard Terms Backfire?

Hillman, Robert A.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511611179.009

Cited by 17 publications

(20 citation statements)

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“…Acquisti and Grossklags [25] discuss consumers' limited knowledge and understanding of privacy and security risks. Further, misaligned economic incentives limit distributors' desire to improve EULA terms (see, for example, Vila et al [26]) and consumers feel that it is not worth it to read notices [8,26,27].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, Hillman [27] argues that mandatory display of license terms on Web sites will improve access of consumer protection organizations. However, he cautions that the improved accessibility might backfire (at consumer rights) if terms still do not receive added scrutiny, or are not read more often compared to the current notice regime.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Empirical Studies on Software Notices to Inform Policy Makers and Usability Designers

Großklags

Good

2007

Financial Cryptography and Data Security

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Empirical Studies on Software Notices to Inform Policy Makers and Usability Designers

Großklags

Good

2007

Financial Cryptography and Data Security

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“…Rather, the results suggest that, to the extent there are inefficiencies associated with this class of contracts, they are not made worse by delayed disclosure. The results call into question the need for recent proposals urging mandatory presale disclosure and proposals urging notice that terms will follow in situations in which disclosure is impossible (see Hillman 2006). Instead, the results suggest that the question to address in future research should be whether the terms in standard-form contracts in general are the result of competitive market forces.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…Hillman (2006), however, argues that such a rule may backfire. If buyers do not read standard terms at all, mandatory disclosure will not increase readership and term shopping.…”

Section: Procd V Zeidenberg and The Defense Of Rolling Contractsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements

Marotta‐Wurgler

2009

The Journal of Legal Studies

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The rise of commerce over the Internet and telephone has led to widespread use of "pay now, terms later," or rolling, standard-form contracts, in which buyers are not able to read the standard terms until after they have purchased the product. While some scholars and judges argue that rolling contracts do not merit special attention, others, including consumer advocates, are concerned that sellers take advantage of delayed disclosure by hiding especially unfavorable terms. I find no evidence for this view. In a large sample of software license agreements, I find that software publishers that use rolling contracts for their online sales do not offer more one-sided terms than those who make their licenses available prior to purchase. The results suggest that to the extent there are inefficiencies associated with standard-form contracts, they are not made worse by delayed disclosure.

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“…This reformist camp believes on-line vendors have an incentive to write one-sided, onerous contract terms given that consumers do not read CTAs. Consequently, these scholars advocate greater judicial scrutiny of these contracts either through policing the substantive fairness of contract terms (Korobkin, 2003), establishing a rule that certain terms are presumptively unenforceable (Lorsen, 2004;Radin, 2000), or requiring more prominent disclosure of contract terms (Hillman and Barakat, 2008;Hillman, 2006b;Gomulkiewicz, 2004). The second camp acknowledges the general lack of CTA readership but believes market forces will ensure CTAs are substantively fair.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Blind consent? A social psychological investigation of non-readership of click-through agreements.

Plaut¹,

Bartlett²

2012

Law and Human Behavior

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Across two studies we aimed to measure empirically the extent of non-readership of clickthrough agreements (CTAs), identify the dominant social representations that exist about CTAs, and experimentally manipulate these representations in order to decrease automatic non-reading behavior and enhance contract efficiency. In our initial questionnaire study (Study 1), as predicted, the vast majority of participants reported not reading CTAs and the most prevalent social representations of CTAs contributing to non-readership included: they are too long and time-consuming, they are all the same, they give one no choice but to agree, they are not important, the companies are reputable, and they are irrelevant. Manipulating these representations on a simulated music web site (Study 2) revealed an increase in readership.Additionally, CTA comprehension and CTA rejection rates were both increased significantly by manipulating the length representation. These results demonstrate support for the influence of social representations on CTA readership, provide evidence against the common "limited cognition" perspective on non-readership, and suggest that presenting CTAs in a short, readable format can increase CTA readership and comprehension as well as shopping of CTA terms. Word count: 179Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through AgreementsEvery day, individuals using the Internet are confronted with a choice: to accept or not accept the terms of click-through agreements ("CTAs"). Used by on-line vendors to set forth the legal relationship between a vendor and its consumers (Kunz, Del Duca, Thayer, & Debrow, 2001), CTAs are ubiquitous in the on-line world. Requiring but a simple click of "I agree" to be formed, CTAs are commonly used to establish the terms of use of a website, the terms upon which a consumer may download and use a software program, or the terms upon which a consumer may shop on-line. Additionally, CTAs often include other "boilerplate terms" such as the right of a vendor to collect and disseminate a consumer's personal information and restrictions on the manner in which a consumer may bring future legal grievances against a vendor (Marotta-Wurgler, 2007). According to anecdotal evidence and limited survey research (Hillman, 2006a;Becher and Unger-Aviram, 2008), individuals overwhelmingly make the choice to accept-but not read-CTAs, thereby blindly consenting to their terms.Since the advent of the CTA, consumers have made a number of legal challenges against the enforceability of these contracts on the basis that they never read-let alone agreed-to their terms. The vast majority of these challenges have been unsuccessful (Lemley, 2006). While courts acknowledge that consumers do not read CTAs, they find the agreements validly formed contracts given that legal doctrine requires merely that consumers "assent" to the formation of a contract. Consequently, whether or not a consumer actually reads the contract is largely irrelevant. So long as a consumer manifests...

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Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Web Site Disclosure of e-Standard Terms Backfire?

Abstract: Some] regulatory strategies ... achieve an end precisely opposite to the one intended, or to the only public-regarding justification that can be brought forward in their support.").

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

Empirical Studies on Software Notices to Inform Policy Makers and Usability Designers

Empirical Studies on Software Notices to Inform Policy Makers and Usability Designers

Are “Pay Now, Terms Later” Contracts Worse for Buyers? Evidence from Software License Agreements

Blind consent? A social psychological investigation of non-readership of click-through agreements.

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