One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThis study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information regarding demand uncertainty. In the equilibrium of the Stackelberg games, a leader's private information becomes public information among followers. This study demonstrates that the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower is determined by the weight on public information regarding a follower's estimation of demand uncertainty. If the weight is sufficiently low (high), then the relationship is a strategic substitute (complement), and the leader has a first-mover (dis)advantage, respectively. In the case of strategic complementarity, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers.

Multi-Leader Multi-Follower Model with Aggregative Uncertainty

“…We point out that our results hold for the general class of aggregative games and generalize the ones obtained by De Miguel and Xu (see [7]) and by Nakamura (see [15]) for the Cournot oligopoly games. Moreover, we briefly discuss the experimental evaluation based on the Sample Average Approximation (SAA) method (see [16]) for the global emission game.…”

Optimización de modelos de Stackelberg no estacionarios mediante un algoritmo evolutivo auto-adaptativo

“…Se desarrollaron 20 ejecuciones independientes por cada algoritmo sobre cada escenario. ∈ [3,6] ∈ [3,6] ∈ [3,6] (severidad de los cambios) En la Fig. 1 se muestran los resultados de los experimentos realizados en términos de las medidas de rendimiento definidas en las expresiones (2) y (3).…”

Pre‐emptive production and market competitiveness in oligopoly with private information

“…Our study is related to the literature on Cournot and Stackelberg competition models with private information about demand uncertainty (Cumbul, 2021; Gal‐Or, 1987; Nakamura, 2015; Shinkai, 2000). 2 We contribute to the literature by investing new issues such as incentives to pre‐emptive production and producer and consumer surplus.…”