On the Frontline Every Day? Subnational Deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers

Ruggeri, Andrea; Dorussen, Han; Gizelis, Theodora‐Ismene

doi:10.1017/s000712341600017x

Cited by 76 publications

(65 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…55 C.f. Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis 2016. statistically significant at the 95% level. 56 In Model 2, we distinguish between one-sided violence by government and rebel actors, since our discussion suggests that the deployment mechanisms may look different as peacekeepers are more constrained in intervening against government abuses.…”

Section: Non-random Deployment Of Peacekeepersmentioning

confidence: 84%

Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians

Fjelde¹,

Hultman²,

Nilsson³

2018

Int Org

141

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Are UN peacekeepers effective in protecting civilians from violence? Existing studies examine this issue at the country level, thereby making it difficult to isolate the effect of peacekeepers and to assess the actual mechanism at work. This article provides the first comprehensive evaluation of UN peacekeeping success in protecting civilians at the subnational level. We argue that peacekeepers through their sizable local presence can increase the political and military costs for warring actors to engage in civilian targeting. Since peacekeepers' access to civilian populations rests on government consent, peacekeepers will primarily be effective in imposing these costs on rebel groups, but less so for government actors. To test these conjectures we combine new monthly data on the location of peacekeepers with data on the location and timing of civilian killings in Africa. Our findings suggest that local peacekeeping presence enhances the effectiveness of civilian protection against rebel abuse, but that UN peacekeeping struggles to protect civilians from government forces.

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Section: Non-random Deployment Of Peacekeepersmentioning

confidence: 84%

Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians

Fjelde¹,

Hultman²,

Nilsson³

2018

Int Org

141

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Empirical studies on peacekeeping need to tackle the problem that peacekeepers are not randomly deployed; usually, the most violent conflicts and locations host peacekeepers (Fortna ; Gilligan and Stedman ; Ruggeri, Dorussen, and Gizelis ). This is problematic when one wants to assess the effect of peacekeeping on political violence.…”

Section: Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Peacekeepers against Criminal Violence—Unintended Effects of Peacekeeping Operations?

Salvatore

2019

American J Political Sci

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Research shows that peacekeepers reduce conflict intensity; however, effects of deployment on nonpolitical violence are unknown. This article focuses on criminal violence and proposes a twofold mechanism to explain why peacekeeping missions, even when effectively reducing conflict, can inadvertently increase criminal violence. First, less conflict opens up economic opportunities (so-called peacekeeping economies) and provides operational security for organized crime, thus increasing violent competition among criminal groups. Second, demobilized combatants are vulnerable to turn to crime because of limited legal livelihood opportunities and their training in warfare. While UN troops may exacerbate these dynamics, UN police's peculiar role is likely to successfully contain criminal violence. Cross-national and subnational empirical analyses show that large UN military deployments result in higher homicide rates, whereas UN police, overall, moderate this collateral effect.

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“…This is due to two reasons: first, previous research has shown that international actors like the UN tend to engage in the most severe cases, where third party guarantees are most needed due to the severity of the conflict or the deep cleavages between the conflict parties (Ruggeri, Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016). This means that chances of peace are lower from the outset than in countries where conflict is less severe.…”

Section: Graph 1 -Ssr In Conflict and Transitional Countries (In Percmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security sector reform in Africa: Donor approaches versus local needs

Ansorg

2017

Contemporary Security Policy

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Abstract:Many African states have security sector reform (SSR) programs. These are often internationally funded. But how do such programs account for previously existing security institutions and the security needs of local communities? This article examines SSR all over Africa to assess local ownership and path dependency from a New Institutionalist perspective. It finds that SSR, particularly in post-conflict countries, tends to be driven by ideas and perceptions of international donors promoting generalized blueprints. Often, such programs only account in a very limited way for path-dependent aspects of security institutions or the local context. Hence the reforms often lack local participation and are thus not accepted by the local community eventually.

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On the Frontline Every Day? Subnational Deployment of United Nations Peacekeepers

Abstract: Research has shown that United

Cited by 76 publications

References 44 publications

Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians

Protection Through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and the Costs of Targeting Civilians

Peacekeepers against Criminal Violence—Unintended Effects of Peacekeeping Operations?

Security sector reform in Africa: Donor approaches versus local needs

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