Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy

Abstract

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.

How Do Observers Assess Resolve?

“…Resolve is one of the most central concepts in the study of international politics, used to explain why actors win on the battlefield and prevail at the bargaining table (e.g., Schelling, 1960;Jervis, 1976;Sechser and Fuhrmann, 2017). It is also not directly observable.…”

The Logic of the Survival of North Korea

“…During the Gulf War in 1991, Iraq fired Scud missiles at Israel, the most important ally of the USA in the Middle East, but the attack against the “hostage” did not lead to a withdrawal of American forces from the Persian Gulf (Henriksen, ). Similarly, in the Cold War period, “French leader Charles de Gaulle and others doubted that the United States would be willing to sacrifice New York or Washington in order to defend Paris or London” (Sechser & Fuhrmann, ; p. 54). Defending the interests of one's allies is merely a secondary goal in the self‐help international system; a state's ultimate goal is the pursuit of its own national interests, and allies are just a means of it.…”

The Logic of Latent Nuclear Deterrence

“…31 Kapur (2007). 32 For a comprehensive discussion of nuclear coercion, see Sechser & Fuhrmann (2017). 33 The quotation is from Walt Rostow and is quoted in Burr & Richelson (2000/2001 attack.…”

“…The costs of nuclearization are hardly trivial, but they will rarely be large enough to make threats to go nuclear obviously incredible, except in a case where a state has nothing to gain from possessing a nuclear arsenal. 4342Sechser & Fuhrmann (2017).43 We may only observe proliferation in cases where the expected costs are relatively low; when the costs are very high (and therefore most likely to be observed), states are unlikely to seek an…”

“…The "sprinting" language comes from the study referenced here. 53 SeeJervis (1989) andSechser & Fuhrmann (2017).…”