Normative structures, collaboration and conflict in irrigation; a case study of the Pillaro North Canal Irrigation System, Ecuadorian Highlands

Abstract

This paper analyzes conflict and collaboration and their relation to normative structures based on a case study of the history and external interventions of the Píllaro North Canal Irrigation System in the Ecuadorian Highlands. It does so by using Ostrom's framework for analyzing the sustainability of socioecological systems together with an analysis of the normative structures that define the governance systems through which the interactions in irrigation systems are mediated. I argue that the external interventions by the state and NGOs imposed a new governance system that undermined the existing normative structures and related organizations, leading to internal conflicts. The case study suggests that a reformulation of irrigation policies and state intervention methodologies in user managed supra-community irrigation systems in the Andes could lead to higher levels of cooperation.

The evolution of norms and their influence on performance among self-governing irrigation systems in the Southwestern United States

“…Therefore, it appears that for acequias that have not been dramatically disrupted by Anglo institutions, a monitoring agent may be very important for reinforcing cooperative norms and ensuring shared benefits of self-governance as aridity worsens. However, where cooperative norms are in conflict with private rights to water among Conejos acequias, a monitoring agent enforcing private rights is associated with an increase in water use violations and lower average crop production, similar to previous findings where norms and rules conflicted (Kamran and Shivakoti 2013;Vollan et al 2013;Hoogesteger 2015). In this instance, a monitoring agent could be an impediment to successful adaptation to climate change and may even be a catalyst for changes to acequias which deviate from cooperative norms.…”

“…average crop growth) and social cohesion (e.g. water use violations, crop production equality) (Skjølsvold 2010;Hoogesteger 2015). In an era of climate change, interventions need to be carefully coordinated with the target community in order to diagnose specific problems that can be solved while maintaining adaptive norms (Meinzen-Dick 2014).…”

“…On balance, the literature implies that individuals who are more intrinsically competitive will likely respond with more cooperative behavior if rules enforcing cooperative behavior are in place (Ostrom 2000;Rustagi et al 2010), while individuals who are more intrinsically cooperative will likely respond with little to no increase in cooperative behavior and may even show declines due to crowding-out (Kinzig et al 2013;Rode et al 2015). This appears to be supported in the field, where externally imposed rules that are not congruent with local cooperative norms produce worse commons management (Ostrom 2000;Kamran and Shivakoti 2013;Vollan et al 2013;Hoogesteger 2015).…”

“…From a governance perspective, norms influence the efficacy of external interventions and shape how local resource users respond to shocks, including price fluctuations, climate-related events, and external governance interventions (Kinzig et al 2013;Rode et al 2015;Roth et al 2015). Without a better understanding of how norms and multiple sources of authority work in a CPR, governance actors may make decisions that undermine the sustainability of CPRs and harm adaptation to climate change (Brunsa et al 2001;Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002;Skjølsvold 2010;Hoogesteger 2015). In the case of irrigation systems, this could lead to food insecurity, mass migration, and conflict (Gleick 2014;Meinzen-Dick 2014).…”