No luck for moral luck

Kneer, Markus; Machery, Édouard

doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2018.09.003

Cited by 91 publications

(165 citation statements)

References 39 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

127

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…= .81). We analyzed punishment ratings separately because recent research suggests that punishment is considerably more sensitive to outcome than permissibility, wrongness, and blame (Kneer & Machery, 2019; but see Cushman, 2008). The correlations of repeated measures were .71 for moral judgment and .79 for punishment.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even if the harm that occurs is beyond the agent's control, people judge actions and agents more harshly when the consequences are more severe (as in the opening example of a man throwing a stone and fatally hitting a person), thereby exhibiting outcome effects (Cushman, 2008;Cushman et al, 2009;Gino et al, 2009;Gino et al, 2010;Kneer & Machery, 2019;Lench et al, 2015;Young et al, 2010; for a review, cf. Martin & Cushman, 2015).…”

Section: Do You Feel the Same? The Effect Of Outcome Severity On Moramentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The impact of outcome on moral judgment would thus be mediated by epistemic state ascriptions. Another mediation account suggests that severity of outcome affects the perceived likelihood of the harmful outcome, which leads to differing ascriptions of mens rea (or "inculpating state of mind") defined in terms of risk such as recklessness or negligence, and consequently moral judgment (Kneer & Machery, 2019).…”

Section: Explanations Of the Outcome Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Alternatively, one could interpret the different assessments of probability across outcomes as an instance of the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975): ex-post considerations inappropriately interfere with evaluations that should be undertaken from an ex-ante perspective. The biased assessment of the outcome probability leads to a distorted evaluation of mens rea and consequently to an inappropriate moral judgment in the bad outcome case (Alicke, 2000;Alicke & Rose, 2010;Kneer & Machery, 2019;Nadelhoffer, 2006;Royzman & Kumar, 2004).…”

Section: Outcome Effects Across Social Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The Effect of Outcome Severity on Moral Judgment and Interpersonal Goals of Perpetrators, Victims, and Bystanders

Frisch¹,

Kneer²,

Krueger³

et al. 2020

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

When two actors have exactly the same mental states but one happens to harm another person (unlucky actor) and the other one does not (lucky actor), the latter elicits milder moral judgment among bystanders. We hypothesized that the social role from which transgressions are perceived would moderate this outcome effect. In three preregistered experiments (N = 950), we randomly assigned participants to imagine and respond to moral scenarios as actor (i.e., perpetrator), victim, or bystander. Results revealed highly similar outcome effects on moral judgment across social roles. However, as predicted, the social role moderated the strength of the outcome effect on interpersonal goals pertaining to agency and communion. Although in agreement about the blameworthiness of lucky and unlucky actors, victims’ agency and communion were more sensitive to the outcome severity than perpetrators’ agency and communion, with bystanders’ outcome sensitivity falling in between. Outcome severity affected agency and communion directly instead of being mediated by moral judgment. We discuss the possibility that outcome severity raises normative expectations regarding interaction in a transgression’s aftermath that are unrelated to moral considerations.

show abstract

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Do You Feel the Same? The Effect Of Outcome Severity On Moramentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Explanations Of the Outcome Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Outcome Effects Across Social Rolesmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Effect of Outcome Severity on Moral Judgment and Interpersonal Goals of Perpetrators, Victims, and Bystanders

Frisch¹,

Kneer²,

Krueger³

et al. 2020

Preprint

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…A different approach to eliciting the participants' reflective attitudes is adopted by Kneer and Machery (2019). In relation to moral judgments, they argue that isolated case judgments in between-subject designs are prone to the influences of performance errors like hindsight bias.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Norm conflicts and conditionals.

Skovgaard-Olsen¹,

Kellen²,

Hahn³

et al. 2019

Psychological Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Suppose that two competing norms, N 1 and N 2 , can be identified such that a given person's response can be interpreted as correct according to N 1 but incorrect according to N 2. Which of these two norms, if any, should one use to interpret such a response? In this paper we seek to address this fundamental problem by studying individual variation in the interpretation of conditionals by establishing individual profiles of the participants based on their case judgments and reflective attitudes. To investigate the participants' reflective attitudes we introduce a new experimental paradigm called the Scorekeeping Task. As a case study, we identify the participants who follow the Suppositional Theory of conditionals (N 1) versus Inferentialism (N 2) and investigate to what extent internally consistent competence models can be reconstructed for the participants on this basis. After extensive empirical investigations, an apparent reasoning error with and-to-if inferences was found in one of these two groups. The implications of this case study for debates on the proper role of normative considerations in psychology are discussed.

show abstract