New Evidence on the Lending Channel

Abstract

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Bank Heterogeneity and Interest Rate Setting: What Lessons Have We Learned since Lehman Brothers?

“…We also control for other bank‐specific characteristics that are worth investigating to detect loan supply shifts: (i) the ratio between deposits and total funding (RETAIL) used in Berlin and Mester (); (ii) a dummy for mutual banks (MUTUAL), which are subject to a special regulatory regime (Angelini, Di Salvo, and Ferri ); (iii) the ratio of lending to total banking activity (LENDING); (iv) the interbank average interest rate prior to the crisis (INTERB_SPREAD); (v) the bank's geographical zone; (vi) a dummy for banks that belong to a group (GROUP) to check for the presence of internal capital markets (Ashcraft ); (vii) the ratio of securitized lending over total loans (SEC_RATIO) in the 3 years prior to Lehman's default; and (viii) a dummy for banks that received specific government support during the period of investigation (GOV_HELP).…”

U.S. Banking Deregulation, Small Businesses, and Interstate Insurance of Personal Income

“…Houston and James (1998) show that unaffiliated banks are more cash‐flow‐constrained than banks affiliated with a holding company. Ashcraft (2006) argues that banks affiliated with a holding company have better access to external funds, and further, that stand‐alone banks face more severe financial constraints than affiliated banks. As a consequence, in states where stand‐alone banks have more market share, aggregate lending is relatively more affected by monetary policy contractions.…”

Bank lending channel in a dual banking system: Why are Islamic banks so responsive?

“…If banks are not able to find alternative sources of funding to compensate for this deposit withdrawal, the supply of bank loans will decrease. Although this spillover chain is well established for varying size (Kashyap & Stein, ; Stein & Kashyap, ), liquidity (Ashcraft, ; Stein & Kashyap, ) and capitalisation (Kishan & Opiela, ) of banks, there is still lack of evidence on how this mechanism works for different bank types. Studying the monetary transmission mechanism for different bank types is relevant because it may have different impacts on bank lending.…”