Network Pricing and Rate Allocation with Content Provider Participation

Hande, Prashanth; Chiang, Mung; Calderbank, Robert; Rangan, Sundeep

doi:10.1109/infcom.2009.5062010

Cited by 117 publications

(67 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…additional transit revenue from the content provider in a two sided" payment model to ISP1 [4,7]. Then, unless D = 0 there is no optimal p 3 : as it increases, so does U 1 .…”

Section: Discussion Of Side Paymentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Study of Non-Neutral Networks

Altman¹,

Bernhard²,

Kesidis³

et al. 2010

SSRN Journal

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Abstract:Hahn and Wallsten [3] wrote that net neutrality usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers only once for Internet access, do not favor one content provider over another, and do not charge content providers for sending information over broadband lines to end users." In this paper we study the implications of being non-neutral, particularly by charging the content providers. Using game theoretic tools, we show that by adding the option for the service providers to charge the content providers, not only may the content providers and the internauts suer, but also the access provider's performance degrades.

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“…additional transit revenue from the content provider in a two sided" payment model to ISP1 [4,7]. Then, unless D = 0 there is no optimal p 3 : as it increases, so does U 1 .…”

Section: Discussion Of Side Paymentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Study of Non-Neutral Networks

Altman¹,

Bernhard²,

Kesidis³

et al. 2010

SSRN Journal

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“…Network Neutrality in Network Utility Maximization Issues Hande et al [39] consider the two-sided market in a quite different context. Instead of using the predefined price-demand curve, they look into the network utility maximization with the participation of the CPs.…”

Section: Regulation Mechanisms Based On Cooperative Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Net Neutrality and Quality of Service

Altman

Rojas

Wong

et al. 2012

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Abstract. 2010 has witnessed many public consultations around the world concerning Net neutrality. A second legislative phase that may follow, could involve various structural changes in the Internet. The status that the Internet access has in Europe as a universal service evolves as the level of quality of service (QoS) to be offered improves. If guarantees on QoS are to be imposed, as requested by several economic actors, it would require introducing new indicators of quality of services, as well as regulation legislation and monitoring of the offered levels of QoS. This tendency in Europe may change the nature of the Internet from a best effort network to, perhaps, a more expensive one, that offers guaranteed performance. This paper presents an overview of the above issues as well as an overview of recent research on net-neutrality, with an emphasis on game theoretical approaches.

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“…We use a function g(·) defined on [0, 1] to express the QoS provided by NSP S2 as q2 = g(λ2). For simplicity, we assume as in [4] that the cost of serving subscribers is fixed and smaller than the level that drives the NSPs out of the market so that we can use revenue maximization as the objective of the NSPs.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, without considering the interplay between different NSPs, the authors in [4] formulated a rate allocation problem by incorporating the participation of content providers into the model, and derived equilibrium prices and data rates. In [5], the authors showed that non-cooperative communications markets suffer from unfair revenue distribution among NSPs and proposed a revenue-sharing mechanism that requires cooperation among NSPs.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Subscription dynamics and competition in communications markets

Ren

Park

Schaar

2010

Proceedings of the 2010 Workshop on Economics of Networks, Systems, and Computation

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Multiple technologies, possibly administered by different entities, are expected to coexist in the rapidly-expanding communications market. In order to understand the complex interactions between different technologies, it is of fundamental importance to understand how technologies affect the demand of users and competition between network service providers (NSPs).To this end, we analyze user subscription dynamics and competition between NSPs in a duopoly communications market. First, we investigate the impact of technologies on the users' dynamic subscription and show that, for any charged prices, the equilibrium point of the considered user subscription dynamics exists and is unique. Next, we derive a sufficient condition on the technologies of the NSPs that ensures the user subscription dynamics to reach the equilibrium point. Then, we model the NSP competition using a non-cooperative game, in which the two NSPs choose their market shares independently, and provide a sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of at least one pure Nash equilibrium in the market competition game.

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Network Pricing and Rate Allocation with Content Provider Participation

Cited by 117 publications

References 15 publications

A Study of Non-Neutral Networks

A Study of Non-Neutral Networks

Net Neutrality and Quality of Service

Subscription dynamics and competition in communications markets

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