Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms

Kourandi, Frago; Valletti, Tommaso

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2395991

Cited by 50 publications

(85 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…This preferential access to the wireless internet to the application and service providers with deep pocketscan lead to an indirect control of the internet by the network operators. In addition, in a discriminatory regime, since the advertising revenue will always be attractive to the network operators, they may abandon their neutral role and degrade the quality of the nonpriority lane to mine greater profits from the priority lanes [10].…”

Section: Editorial Commentarymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Pay or Perish Game: Why we should stand up against ‘active discrimination’ for the survival of net neutrality

Kumar¹

2015

IETE Technical Review

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Section: Editorial Commentarymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Pay or Perish Game: Why we should stand up against ‘active discrimination’ for the survival of net neutrality

Kumar¹

2015

IETE Technical Review

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“…Higher investment in superior network technology can nevertheless result from QoS differentiation that enhances the quality of content provision and therefore increases the demand for content with higher network QoS requirements (BARANES 2013). In particular, papers that allow for entry of new content make a strong case for the likelihood of capacity investments under priority service (KRÄMER and WIEWIORRA 2012, ECONOMIDES and HERMALIN 2012, and BOURREAU, KOURANDI and VALLETTI 2012. Thus, allowing QoS differentiation could lead to both better utilization of existing capacity and more efficient (not necessarily more) investment in network capacity.…”

Section: Priority Service (Csp Tiering)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a two-sided market model with two competing internet platforms and a continuum of heterogeneous CSPs, BOURREAU, KOURANDI and VALLETTI (2012) show that in a discriminatory regime with priority pricing network investment and content innovation are both higher and welfare is increased compared to a net neutrality regime. Increased competition among CSPs resulting from discrimination may make CSPs worse off, though.…”

Section: Net Neutrality Network Competition and Competition Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

Vogelsang

2013

Review of Economics

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Telecommunications policy has come a long way from regulation of vertically integrated monopolies to the current state of competition. As competition becomes selfsustainable, will telecommunications policy in the form of industry-specific regulation go away or, if not, what form will it take? The economics literature suggests that the regulatory efficiency frontier is shifted by new technological and market developments, such as convergence of networks, fixed-mobile substitution (and integration) and next generation access networks. The frontier is also affected by the existing capital stock and other physical and institutional characteristics of a country. The insights from a review of the theoretical and empirical literature are applied to five policy areas. They are: (1) termination monopoly; (2) local bottleneck access; (3) net neutrality; (4) spectrum management; and (5) universal service. While in some of them, deregulation and a move to competition policy will soon be the efficient state of the art, regulation will remain efficient in others for some time. Deregulation will likely become efficient for one-way access and universal service, with the exception of some universal service policies in remote areas and for the poor. Termination will move to bill and keep with a duty to interconnect. In addition, some (more symmetric) regulation should persist for net neutrality in the form of transparency requirements, (quasi-) common carrier obligations and minimum quality standards. Also, spectrum management, while moving towards full-blown ownership rights, will continue to see regulators providing zoning and other services, particularly for unlicensed spectrum. All these assessments are premised on the success of making additional spectrum as the key resource available. They are also premised on the absence of a killer technology like P2P FTTH that potentially dominates all other technologies. What determines the endgame in telecommunications regulation? Although technical and market developments will dominantly shape the regulatory efficiency frontier, institutional and political economy factors have an additional and mostly slowing effect on policy changes. (JEL: L43; L86; L96; L98.

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“…Choi et al (2013) present a similar setup but also account for the interconnection aspect between networks which makes it more comparable to our model. However, the most closely related work is the model by Bourreau et al (2015) where competing ISPs offer queueing based prioritization to differentiated CPs and ISPs face a prisoner's dilemma when deciding whether to introduce prioritization, a result which recurs in our own analysis.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Interconnection and Prioritization

Baake

Sudaric

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe analyze pricing and competition under paid prioritization within a model of interconnected internet service providers (ISPs), heterogeneous content providers (CPs) and heterogeneous consumers. We show that prioritization is welfare superior to a regime without prioritization (network neutrality) and yields higher incentives for investment in network capacities. As ISPs price discriminate between on-net and off-net CPs, their bottleneck property is propagated and competition for consumers increases resulting in a potential prisoner's dilemma when deciding whether to offer prioritization. We show that peering for prioritized traffic emerges as a collusive outcome and present off-net prices as a further collusive instrument. JEL-classification numbers: L13, L51, L96

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Net Neutrality with Competing Internet Platforms

Cited by 50 publications

References 21 publications

The Pay or Perish Game: Why we should stand up against ‘active discrimination’ for the survival of net neutrality

The Pay or Perish Game: Why we should stand up against ‘active discrimination’ for the survival of net neutrality

The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey

Interconnection and Prioritization

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