Nash equilibrium uniqueness in nice games with isotone best replies

Ceparano, Maria Carmela; Quartieri, Federico

doi:10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.02.011

Cited by 9 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 31 publications

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“…Under a much more particular form, however, a variant of that definition had already appeared in[8] to prove a fixpoint theorem of Krasnose ľskii type.…”

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confidence: 99%

On $C$-Pareto dominance in decomposably $C$-antichain-convex sets

Ceparano¹,

Quartieri²

2019

Preprint

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This paper shows that-under suitable conditions on a cone C-any element in the convex hull of a decomposably C-antichain-convex set Y is C-Pareto dominated by some element of Y . Building on this, the paper proves the disjointness of the convex hulls of two disjoint decomposably Cantichain-convex sets whenever one of latter is C-upward. These findings are used to obtain several consequences on the structure of the C-Pareto optima of decomposably C-antichain-convex sets, on the separation of decomposably C-antichain-convex sets and on the convexity of the set of maximals of C-antichain-convex relations and of the set of maximizers of C-antichain-quasiconcave functions. Special emphasis is placed on the invariance of the solution set of a problem after its "convexification".

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“…Under a much more particular form, however, a variant of that definition had already appeared in[8] to prove a fixpoint theorem of Krasnose ľskii type.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

On $C$-Pareto dominance in decomposably $C$-antichain-convex sets

Ceparano¹,

Quartieri²

2019

Preprint

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On Pareto Dominance in Decomposably Antichain-Convex Sets

Ceparano

Quartieri

2020

J Optim Theory Appl

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Equilibrium selection in multi-leader-follower games with vertical information

Ceparano

Morgan

2017

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We consider two-stage multi-leader-follower games, called multi-leader-follower games with vertical information,where leaders in the first stage and followers\ud in the second stage choose simultaneously an action, but those chosen by any leader are observed by only one “exclusive” follower. This partial unobservability leads to extensive form games that have no proper subgames but may have an infinity of Nash equilibria. So it is not possible to refine using the concept of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and, moreover, the concept of weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium could be not useful since it does not prescribe limitations on the beliefs out of the equilibrium path. This has motivated the introduction of a selection concept for Nash equilibria based on a specific class of beliefs, called passive beliefs, that each follower has about the actions chosen by the leaders rivals of his own leader. In this paper, we illustrate the effectiveness of this concept and we investigate the existence of such a selection for significant classes of problems satisfying generalized concavity properties and conditions of minimal character on possibly discontinuous data

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Nash equilibrium uniqueness in nice games with isotone best replies

Cited by 9 publications

References 31 publications

On $C$-Pareto dominance in decomposably $C$-antichain-convex sets

On $C$-Pareto dominance in decomposably $C$-antichain-convex sets

On Pareto Dominance in Decomposably Antichain-Convex Sets

Equilibrium selection in multi-leader-follower games with vertical information

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