More than Ideology: Conservative–Liberal Identity and Receptivity to Political Cues

Abstract

To many commentators and social scientists, Americans' stances on political issues are to an important extent driven by an underlying conservativeliberal ideological dimension. Self-identification as conservative vs. liberal is regarded as a marker of this dimension. However, past research has not thoroughly distinguished between ideological identity (a self-categorization) and ideology (an integrated value system). This research evaluates the thesis that conservative-liberal identity functions as a readiness to adopt beliefs and attitudes about newly politicized issues that one is told are consistent with the socially prescribed meaning of conservatism-liberalism. In Study 1, conservative-liberal identity, measured in 2000, had an independent prospective effect on support for invading Iraq in 2002 and support for the Iraq war in 2004, controlling for substantive ideology, party identity, and demographics. In Study 2, conservative-and liberal-identifiers adopted stances on farm subsidy policy based on randomly varied cues indicating which ideological group supports which stance. This cue-based influence was mediated by adoption of attitude-supportive beliefs. Discussion addresses the joint impact of political discourse and identity-based social influence on the organization of political attitudes.

College Students, Sexualities Identities, and Participation in Political Marches

“…One item read: BIn terms of politics do you consider yourself?Î n coding the five-point scale in a liberal direction, the people who called themselves Bvery liberal^received a 5 while the Bvery conservative^respondents received a 1.While there are not universal definitions of what constitutes a liberal stance on politics, many scholars agree that liberals and conservatives differ on the size of government, redistribution policies, affirmative action, abortion, homosexual rights, crime and the support of social change (Malka and Lelkes 2010).…”

The moderating role of identification and campaign exposure in party cueing effects

“…Several authors have argued that party attachment should be considered as a social identity (e.g. Goren et al 2009;Green et al 2002;Malka and Lelkes 2010), leading to 'party identification' . But if party identity is a social identity, then based on premises from social identity theory (e.g.…”

“…Most studies that look at cueing effects employ experimental designs (e.g. Bullock 2011;Cohen 2003;Druckman et al 2013;Goren et al 2009;Kam 2005;Malka and Lelkes 2010;Slothuus and de Vreese 2010), so exposure to party cues is the result of participation in the experiment (and usually verified through a manipulation check). Whether an experimental cue is considered from the in-group party or an out-group party is usually assessed (prior to the experimental manipulation) by asking participants whether they identify themselves as Democrat or Republican (as most studies are performed in the US).…”

“…in a two-party context (e.g. Bullock 2011;Cohen 2003;Dalton et al 1998;Druckman et al 2013;Goren et al 2009;Kam 2005;Malka and Lelkes 2010). Although this bipolar political environment gives a clear distinction between the in-group party and the out-group party, it remains the question whether these findings hold in an environment of multiple parties.…”

How Christians reconcile their personal political views and the teachings of their faith: Projection as a means of dissonance reduction

“…Since the 1980 Presidential election, for example, Jerry Falwell's Moral Majority, James Dobson's Focus on the Family, and other like-minded groups comprising the Christian Right have formally endorsed the Republican Party for its stances on such issues. Once in the Republican fold, Christian voters attracted primarily by these positions on cultural issues are disproportionately exposed to, and come to adopt, the economic positions of their political reference group (15,16). This social identity and peer influence account is further bolstered by evidence that the connection between religiosity and the adoption of conservative issue positions is heavily moderated by political engagement (2,9,17).…”