Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness

Brink, David O.

doi:10.1080/00048408412341311

Cited by 119 publications

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“…41 For the classic argument against the existence of normative properties based on their 'queerness' and our need for a special faculty to detect them, see Mackie (1977). For discussion, see, among many others, Brink (1984), Garner (1990), Joyce (2001), and Shepski (2008). and judgements must be either non-cognitivism or the error theory.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are normative properties descriptive properties?

Streumer

2010

Philos Stud

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Some philosophers think that normative properties are identical to descriptive properties. In this paper, I argue that this entails that it is possible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I argue that Frank Jackson's argument to show that this is possible fails, and that the objections to this argument show that it is impossible to say which descriptive properties normative properties are identical to. I conclude that normative properties are not identical to descriptive properties. I then show that if we combine this conclusion with the conclusion of a different argument that Jackson has given to show that there are no irreducibly normative properties, it follows that there are no normative properties at all.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are normative properties descriptive properties?

Streumer

2010

Philos Stud

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“…The energy of the traditional challenges to moral realism, the arguments from queerness and disagreement (Mackie 1977;Brink 1984), appears to be exhausted. Disagreement is now widely considered irrelevant (Enoch 2009;cf.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

No excuses for moral realism

Sauer

2017

Philos Stud

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Many believe that there is at least some asymmetry between the extent to which moral and non-moral ignorance excuse. I argue that the exculpatory force of moral ignorance-or lack thereof-poses a thus far overlooked challenge to moral realism. I show, firstly, that if there were any mind-independent moral truths, we would not expect there to be an asymmetry in exculpatory force between moral and ordinary ignorance at all. I then consider several attempts the realist might make to deny or accommodate this datum, and show why none of them work.

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“…whenever we suppose that 'right' is R-related to a different property from the one it is R-related to in our linguistic community), not just about some MTE scenarios. So now I'll consider H&T's specific example, about which the thesis that 24 This account comes largely from Brink (1984). I think we take considerations of this kind as decisive in singling out moral uses of words or in identifying moral terms in foreign languages.…”

Section: The Moral Twin Earth Argumentmentioning

confidence: 96%

Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth

Viggiano

2008

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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In order to rebut G. E. Moore's open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes with competent speakers' linguistic intuitions. While Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to 'water', Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the Horgan-Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is: our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.Keywords Ethical naturalism . Moral disagreement . Moral realism . Open question argument . Theory of direct reference . Twin Earth My aim in this paper is to discuss and ultimately reject an objection against ethical naturalism. Ethical naturalism is a form of moral realism: the version of moral realism according to which moral facts (and/or properties) are natural facts (and/or properties). If moral realism can be formulated as the claim that there are moral facts whose obtaining and nature are independent of human beliefs, attitudes, or conventions, naturalists are those realists who claim that these moral facts are natural facts. Naturalism is thus opposed, in meta-ethical debates on moral realism, to two other possible versions of moral realism, according to which moral facts are, respectively, supernatural facts (for example, facts about our immortal souls), or sui generis, i.e. facts of a peculiar kind, distinct from both natural and supernatural facts. Against these views, naturalists claim that moral facts are ordinary natural facts: according to naturalists, ethics deals with the same world as other empirical (natural or social) sciences deal with. As a consequence of this use of the label 'naturalism', Ethic Theory Moral Prac (

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Moral realism and the sceptical arguments from disagreement and queerness

Cited by 119 publications

References 0 publications

Are normative properties descriptive properties?

Are normative properties descriptive properties?

No excuses for moral realism

Ethical Naturalism and Moral Twin Earth

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