“…Such patterns of moral valuation can be metaphorically demarcated by “circles” demarcating boundaries of moral concern, which can accumulate new concentric “rings” in a predictable and perhaps universally applicable fashion. This schema has productively served as the bedrock for research on ascriptions of moral rights and obligations (e.g., Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Bratanova, Loughnan, & Gatersleben, 2012; Crimston, Bain, Hornsey, & Bastian, 2016, 2018a; Laham, 2009; Neldner, Crimston, Wilks, Redshaw, & Nielsen, 2018; Reed & Aquino, 2003; Waytz, Iyer, Young, Haidt, & Graham, 2019; also see Crimston, Hornsey, Bain, & Bastian, 2018b; Graham, Waytz, Meindl, Iyer, & Young, 2017). However, despite the considerable explanatory power provided by the concept of the moral circle, we argue that previous characterizations of the anatomy of moral concern have been incomplete.…”