Moral Autonomy and the Rationality of Science

Abstract

The few extant arguments concerning the autonomy of science in the rational acceptance of hypotheses are examined. It is concluded that science is not morally autonomous, and that the attendant notion of rationality in science decisionmaking is inadequate. A more comprehensive notion of scientific rationality, which encompasses the old one, is proposed as a replacement. The general idea is that scientists qua scientist ought, in their acceptance decisions, to take into account the ethical consequences of acceptance as well as the consequences with regard to the attainment of “purely scientific” or “epistemic” objectives. The result constitutes an argument for a (presumably cooperative) game theoretic treatment of inductive logic.

Registering ‘the Ethical’ in Organization Theory Formation: Towards the Disclosure of an ‘Invisible Force’

“…The positive/normative dichotomy is invoked by Eden politically to affirm and preserve mainstream OMT’s monopoly on ostensibly value-free ‘scientific motivation’. In contrast to CMS, normal OMT is ‘real science’ as it pursues purely epistemic goals which bestow upon it moral autonomy (see Gaa, 1977). Such narratives deny their own mobilization of ‘the ethical register’ in conditioning and warranting scientific analysis (see Fricker, 2007).…”

Discussion of “A theory of evidence based on audit assertions”

“…The logic of scientists' decisions includes an evaluation of the social consequences of their decisions. (See, for example, Gaa, 1977;and Putnam, 1981, ch. 6.)…”

“…The last incamation of this distinction took the form of the "value-neutrality of science," according to which scientists, as rational decision makers, should be concemed only with so-called epistemic values; the social and practical consequences are irrelevant to their decisions as scientists. However, the fact-value thesis and the value-neutrality thesis are largely discredited (Gaa, 1977;Putnam, 1981). In any case and regardless of the acceptability of these in the philosophy of science, few would suggest that auditors should ignore the social consequences of their decisions.…”

Inductive risk and the contexts of communication

“…Douglas argues that everyone, including scientists, has a moral responsibility to "consider the consequences of error" (p.87) when making claims. Therefore, science is not value-free, in that "scientists should consider the potential social and ethical consequences of error in their work, they should weigh the importance of those consequences, and they should set burdens of proof accordingly" (p.87).Rudner's argument convinced many philosophers: for example, Hempel (1965) andGaa (1977). More recently, following Douglas's work, the "argument from inductive risk" has become commonplace, assumed in work by Kitcher (2011, 141-155) and Kukla (2012, 853-855) with discussions of its theoretical implications (Steel, 2010) and its practical implications (for "trust" in science (Wilholt, 2012) and model construction (Biddle and Winsberg, 2012)).…”

“…Rudner's argument convinced many philosophers: for example, Hempel (1965) andGaa (1977). More recently, following Douglas's work, the "argument from inductive risk" has become commonplace, assumed in work by Kitcher (2011, 141-155) and Kukla (2012, 853-855) with discussions of its theoretical implications (Steel, 2010) and its practical implications (for "trust" in science (Wilholt, 2012) and model construction (Biddle and Winsberg, 2012)).…”