Moral authority and status in International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking

Wohlforth, William C.; Carvalho, Benjamin de; Leira, Halvard; Neumann, İver B.

doi:10.1017/s0260210517000560

Cited by 106 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 29 publications

(7 reference statements)

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“…Perceptions do not form in a vacuum, however; they develop in a social context where existing perceptions meet new information about preconditions, intentions or actual behaviour. This underlines the importance of interaction parameters such as trust (for IR application see Bengtsson 2000, Rathbun 2009, Jasinski 2011, reputation (Mercer 1996, Weisiger and Yarhi-Milo 2015, Crescenzi 2017 and status (Ward 2017, Welch Larson 2018; specifically on small states Wohlforth et al 2017); all of whichin different wayscan be hypothesised to influence the subjective and relational assessment of self and others. As the focus of this article is the relationship between perceptions and policy rather than the dynamics of interaction per se, we focus our interest in perceptions on images and roles rather than on the internal dynamics and formation of trust, reputation and status.…”

Section: Perceptions In International Affairsmentioning

confidence: 97%

Internal and external perceptions of small state security: the case of Estonia

Wrange

Bengtsson

2019

European Security

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This article concerns small state security from a cognitive perspective and investigates Estonia as a security actor as perceived by all littoral Baltic Sea states. Drawing on unique elite survey and interview data, the article unpacks similarities and differences among internal (Estonian) and external perceptions of security, threats, and capabilities. The investigation is theoretically informed by research on perceptions, specifically image theory and role theory. Our analysis indicates that there are generally speaking quite similar perceptions among internal and external respondents regarding Estonia's security situation, threat context, and the importance of EU and NATO membership. When it comes to capabilities in the security field, Estonian respondents have a somewhat more positive view than external respondents. Notably, Russian perceptions stand in stark contrast to those of others regarding most dimensions. Relating our results to previous research on national role conceptions, the perceptions we have explicated correspond to three distinct role conceptionsprotectee/faithful ally, subsystem collaborator and regional leader.

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“…To be clear, the vast majority of Russia experts acknowledge that Moscow’s motives are mixed, combining both status-seeking and security. Where they differ is in the relative weight of those two motivations: is security the dominating factor, or is it status-seeking (Paul et al, 2014; Ward, 2017a, 2017b; Wohlforth et al, 2017)? This has important consequences, as depending on whether Russia is predominantly a security or a status-seeking state determines which type of engagement is more likely to succeed: if Russia is primarily motivated by security, then finding cooperation mechanisms for alleviating Russian anxieties is possible, from exchanges of information to arms control agreements.…”

Section: Assessing Russia’s Motives: the Riddle Wrapped In Mysterymentioning

confidence: 99%

How to challenge an international order: Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations

Schmitt¹

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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Many policy and academic debates focus on the extent to which Russia is a revisionist power challenging the ‘liberal world order’. However, there is little agreement on the primary motives explaining the behaviour of Russia, some pointing to her unsatisfied great power ambitions and neo-imperial ideologies, and others to genuine security concerns. Adjudicating those claims is important because of their policy implications for engagement and/or deterrence towards Russia. This article contributes to this debate through a theoretical contribution to practice-based approaches to International Relations. Using De Certeau’s understanding of practices, it analyses Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations and illustrates how this helps infer foreign policy motives, contrary to the field-specific relationalism of Bourdieu-inspired practice approaches. Empirically, it builds on 126 interviews and participant observation in three multilateral security organisations (the United Nations, the NATO–Russia Council and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe). The article shows that at least since 2014, Russian diplomats in the three organisations consistently defend policies and use narratives that reveal more interest in status recognition, sometimes at the expense of security concerns.

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“…Der fredsbygging og utviklingspolitikk var viktige områder for å bygge Norges prestisje (Wohlforth et al 2018), har Norges stillegang til tross for fortsatt engasjement ennå ikke latt seg merke så kraftig at det har medført et merkbart statusfall. Men når Norge skal fremme menneskerettigheter i ulike internasjonale fora, og dersom man går tilbake til en mer aktiv markedsføring av fredsnasjonen Norge internasjonalt, blir det interessant å se hvordan balansegangen mellom å ikke kritisere Kina til enhver pris og et aktivt, vokalt og synlig fredsengasjement kommer til å bli.…”

Section: Tilbake Til Interessepolitikken?unclassified

Engasjementspolitikk på autopilot: Fredsbygging, fredsbevaring og fredsmegling under Børge Brende

Carvalho¹,

Andersen²

2018

Internasjonal Politikk

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NUPIFN er og har lenge vaert en grunnpilar i utenrikspolitikken ført av fredsnasjonen Norge, supplert -og delvis finansiert -gjennom bistandspolitikken. Der egeninteressen ikke rår, dvs. der uegennytten er i førersetet, er det verdiene som styrer kursen. Utenriksminister etter utenriksminister har holdt fast ved «FN-sporet» som rettesnor i utenrikspolitiske saker, men også fortolket dette sporet og bidratt til å endre FNs politikk. Til tross for at enkelte kommentatorer har beklaget at Norge ser ut til å følge «FN-sporet» blindt (Andresen 2011), har Norge flere ganger bidratt til å endre FNs politikk og tilnaerming. Avhengig av politikkområde har Norge innen flere arenaer påberopt seg talerett, og fått politisk gjennomslag i internasjonale fora. Et slikt politikkområde er engasjementspoltikken -her bredt definert som det internasjonale engasjementet med fredsbygging og bistand. Gang på gang har Norge søkt innflytelse utover sin begrensede størrelse hva gjelder FNs fredsbevarende operasjoner (de Carvalho & Lie 2015), og gjennom omfanget av bistanden har Norge blitt en betydelig internasjonal aktør hva gjelder å definere rammene for denne aktiviteten.I dette essayet vil vi kort skissere hovedlinjene av norsk engasjementspolitikk under Børge Brendes periode som utenriksminister (2013-2017) ved å se på Norges engasjement i Colombia før vi retter et mer kritisk blikk på norsk FN-politikk. Da Brende tok over som utenriksminister knyttet det seg flere spørsmål til hvordan en konservativ utenrikspolitikk kom til å se ut (se Leira 2012). Nå fire år senere, 1 Forfatterne takker Halvard Leira, Kristin Haugevik, Iver Neumann, samt tidsskriftets anonyme fagfelle for kommentarer til tidligere utkast. Fokus: Diplomatiminister BrenDe

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“…Significant gaps exist in our knowledge of how patterns of social stratification and status markers co-evolve with and contribute to shaping contestation in international organizations over time. Recent scholarship on social hierarchies in international politics has valuably shown that norms shape (and are shaped by) patterns of social stratification, that is, ‘the differential ranking’ and treatment of actors (including states) as ‘superior and inferior relative to one another in certain socially important respects’ (Parsons, 1940: 841; Towns, 2010: 44–45; Larson et al, 2014; Towns and Rumelili, 2017; Epstein, 2012; Bially Mattern and Zarakol, 2016; Adler-Nissen, 2014; Miller et al, 2015; Wohlforth et al, 2017). Yet this literature has often analyzed social contexts other than formal international organizations.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When democratic governance unites and divides: Social status and contestation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Hecht¹

2020

Cooperation and Conflict

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Scholars and practitioners are increasingly attentive to contestation against symbols and institutions underpinning international order(s). Yet International Relations scholarship can benefit from greater understanding of ways in which contestation interacts with salient dimensions of social status in specific international organizations (IOs). Drawing on evidence from the history of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), with a focus on democratic governance and human rights, this article analyzes status-related contestation as a significant, yet under-examined type of contestation in multilateral diplomacy. Status-related contestation conveys dissatisfaction about symbols, institutions, and actors which reinforce socially significant divisions that place a state (or group of states) at a social disadvantage in a particular multilateral venue. International organizations provide unique social contexts which affect the content of contestation. Building on scholarship in social psychology, constructivism, and status hierarchies in world politics, the article analyzes the evolution of a dimension (or basis) of social status in the OSCE and illustrates that, beyond domestic and material interests, state representatives communicate social identity-related concerns through language, for example, that expresses discontent with dividing lines, unfairness, or (dis)respect, in attempting to minimize negative social identities in multilateral organizations.

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“… 5. Small and middle powers are no less immune to status-seeking interests. See De Carvalho and Neumann (2015), Schulz (2017), Wohlforth et al (2018), Røren (2019), Long and Urdinez (2020). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Back of the queue: Brexit, status loss, and the politics of backlash

Freedman

2020

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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Status anxiety is not a necessary condition for backlash movements, and yet, both are highly complementary. Across political levels, from the community and state to the international system, status anxiety is often cited as a principal grievance and motivator of backlash politics. This article challenges the basic premise behind this framing by arguing that status loss – as a subset of status anxiety – and backlash politics, are essentially co-constitutive phenomena. Status loss can certainly propel backlash movements to form, but claims of status loss and decline are also uniquely exploitable mechanisms for bringing backlash movements into existence. Rather than treat objective status loss as an obvious cause of backlash movements, then, this article switches the focus to how subjective narratives of status loss are constructed, promoted, retrieved, and contested, in order to either advance, or oppose, the cause of backlash entrepreneurs. Doing so illustrates a primary mechanism of backlash politics, but also a primary mechanism of status loss, challenging dominant intrinsic and material premises on the role of status in international relations. This discussion is illustrated through a focus on Britain’s 2016 referendum on the European Union, and the extent to which both Leave and Remain campaigners elevated the rhetoric of status loss in defence of alternative pasts, presents, and futures.

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Moral authority and status in International Relations: Good states and the social dimension of status seeking

Cited by 106 publications

References 29 publications

Internal and external perceptions of small state security: the case of Estonia

How to challenge an international order: Russian diplomatic practices in multilateral security organisations

Engasjementspolitikk på autopilot: Fredsbygging, fredsbevaring og fredsmegling under Børge Brende

When democratic governance unites and divides: Social status and contestation in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

Back of the queue: Brexit, status loss, and the politics of backlash

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