Monetary dialogue 2009–2014: Looking backward, looking forward

Belke, Ansgar

doi:10.1007/s10272-014-0501-3

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 4 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…While the Monetary Dialogues do not seem to have influenced financial market expectations, they do contribute to greater transparency and therefore legitimacy (Collignon and Diessner 2016). Considering the fiscal implications of ECB actions during the sovereign debt crisis, however, the Monetary Dialogue's structure could be reconsidered to ensure adequate accountability (Belke 2014); it also could improve its focus and make better use of the expert reports (Whelan 2014).…”

Section: Unconventional Monetary Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Constraints of Central Bank Independence: The European Central Bank's Unconventional Monetary Policy and Incremental Accountability in the Euro Crisis

Chang¹

2019

JCER

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The European Central Bank (ECB) is one of the most independent central banks in the world, but this independence is also highly constrained: the Maastricht Treaty established a primary mandate to pursue price stability and prohibited it from engaging in monetary financing. Using an historical institutional framework, this article analyses the ECB's unconventional monetary policy during the Euro crisis. The Maastricht Treaty's constraints forced the ECB to act incrementally during the crisis and rely primarily on the layering of institutional changes. Nevertheless, the self-reinforcing effect identified by historical institutionalism meant that these gradual changes had important consequences over time. The unconventional monetary policies are contrasted with the more drastic institutional change instigated by the Member States, the ECB's designation as the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). The self-reinforcing effects and path dependence set by the ECB's high degree of independence in the Maastricht Treaty, however, also constrained the EU in ensuring the accountability of the ECB, as the accountability structure is another instance of layering despite the very different nature and consequences of financial policy supervision.

show abstract

Section: Unconventional Monetary Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Constraints of Central Bank Independence: The European Central Bank's Unconventional Monetary Policy and Incremental Accountability in the Euro Crisis

Chang¹

2019

JCER

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Therefore, the smooth functioning of the Dialogue has been said to have been threatened by the crisis and the changes it has induced for the ECB, for instance because of its participation in the Troika. 22 The new unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by the ECB over the past years are arguably more difficult to assess and made accountable. This is problematic in the sense that the Monetary dialogue would arguably have to be reformed for functions such as that of financial market supervisor or for the resort to quantitative easing to be covered within its scope, even if, generally, the ECB's accountability framework has been found by the ECB to be resilient in the context of the GFC, allowing for adaptations without any formal amendments.…”

Section: The Ecb and Its Accountability In The Monetary Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Guaranteeing the ECB’s democratic accountability in the post-Banking Union era: An ever more difficult task?

Fromage

2019

Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Following the Great Financial Crisis, the European Central Bank's functions have been significantly altered. It is now involved in the functioning of a variety of European Union bodies and agencies, new powers in the field of banking supervision have been attributed to it and it has resorted to unconventional monetary policy. Such a concentration of powers arguably gives rise to issues of accountability and institutional balance within the European Union: (i) the resulting institutional framework is particularly complex and difficult to understand; (ii) the numerous functions the European Central Bank assumes makes it increasingly difficult to identify in which arena(s) it should be held to account for which action; and (iii) its role in the different bodies or agencies may vary in theory and in practice, which, in turn, influences the degree to which the European Central Bank should be held to account. This article aims at showing to what extent the European Central Bank's role has multiplied and diversified with a view to assess how it is held to account in those different instances, and what the consequences are for the European Central Bank's democratic accountability, primarily towards the European Parliament, as well as towards the Council of the European Union and national parliaments where applicable.

show abstract

“…The discussions regarding transparency have been oriented both to 'conventional' monetary policy issues and to the issues emerging from the new role that the ECB has taken during the financial crisis (Belke 2014). Regarding the new role, the ECB introduced a variety of unconventional policy measures such as announcing the Outright Monetary Transaction Programme, the programme under which the ECB can purchase the bonds of European governments in the secondary market.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transparency and trust: the case of the European Central Bank

Horváth

Katuščáková

2016

Applied Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We examine how the transparency of the European Central Bank's monetary policy affects the amount of trust that the citizens of the European Union have in this institution. We use nearly half a million individual responses from the European Commission's Eurobarometer survey from 2000 to 2011 and estimate probit regressions with sample selection. We find that transparency exerts a non-linear effect on trust. Transparency increases trust, but only up to a certain point; too much transparency harms trust. This result is robust to controlling for a number of macroeconomic conditions, financial stability transparency measures, and economic and socio-demographic characteristics of respondents, including examining respondents in European Union countries that do not use the euro and addressing clustering issues.

show abstract

Monetary dialogue 2009–2014: Looking backward, looking forward

Cited by 6 publications

References 4 publications

The Constraints of Central Bank Independence: The European Central Bank's Unconventional Monetary Policy and Incremental Accountability in the Euro Crisis

The Constraints of Central Bank Independence: The European Central Bank's Unconventional Monetary Policy and Incremental Accountability in the Euro Crisis

Guaranteeing the ECB’s democratic accountability in the post-Banking Union era: An ever more difficult task?

Transparency and trust: the case of the European Central Bank

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About