Modularity of mind and the role of incentive motivation in representing novelty

Abstract

Animal and human brains contain a myriad of mental representations that have to be successfully tracked within fractions of a second in a large number of situations. This retrieval process is hard to explain without postulating the massive modularity of cognition. Assuming that the mind is massively modular, it is then necessary to understand how cognitive modules can efficiently represent dynamic environments-in which some modules may have to deal with change-induced novelty and uncertainty. Novelty of a stimulus is a problem for a module when unknown, significant stimuli do not satisfy the module's processing criteria-or domain specificity-and cannot therefore be included in its database. It is suggested that the brain mechanisms of incentive motivation, recruited when faced with novelty and uncertainty, induce transient variations in the domain specificity of cognitive modules in order to allow them to process information they were not prepared to learn. It is hypothesised that the behavioural transitions leading from exploratory activity to habit formation are correlated with (and possibly caused by) the organism's ability to counter novelty-induced uncertainty.

Arthropod Intelligence? The Case for Portia

“…Much of the time, it seems implicit that the issue of interest is the level to which intelligence is expressed in a domain-general manner. However, the extent to which cognitive processes used by animals are domain-specific instead of domain-general remains poorly understood ( Chiappe and MacDonald, 2005 ; Anselme, 2012 ), and arguments that improving capacity for domain-general intelligence requires a higher investment in mass of expensive brain tissue ( Burkart et al, 2017 ) suggests that especially small animals, including spiders, will be skewed more toward domain-specific intelligence than is the case for larger animals such as birds and mammals ( Logan et al, 2018 ). Research on Portia may be especially interesting in this context.…”

Análisis de la explosión del vocabulario en infantes hispano hablantes

“…La rapidez y eficacia con las que un individuo aprende y emplea el lenguaje ha llevado a considerarlo como el resultado de una habilidad innata consecuencia de un arreglo modular del cerebro del ser humano (Anselme, 2012;Carruthers, 2006), donde la aparición de la lengua hablada y comprendida, depende de un detonante específico que es la exposición a una lengua gramaticalmente posible. En contrapropuesta a esta idea de predisposición innata sobre el origen del lenguaje, se sugiere que existe una paulatina "modularización" de habilidades generales que posee el ser humano, las cuales evolucionan a habilidades específicas, convenientes y útiles al dominio cognitivo que corresponden (Pinker & Jackendoff, 2013).…”

Structural and Functional Organizing Principles of Language: Evolving Theories

“…The general application of the modularity concept to cognitive functions (Marr 1982, Coltheart 1999, Anselme 2012) resulted in the assumption of massive modularity for the human mind while other theories of modularity such as the (i) core knowledge modules position (Spelke & Kinzler 2007) distinguished limited number of core knowledge modules (object, action, number, geometry, and social partner representation), or in a version of core modules, six big traits (intelligence, openness, contentiousness, agreeableness, emotional stability, and extraversion) modules presumed to be domain specific, innate, and even shared across species (reviewed in Twyman & Newcombe 2010). Modules defined by these theories, however, do not conform to the module definition (Fodor 1983), few are encapsulated, and most are involved in various cognitive functions.…”

“…While cognitive modules clearly function in dynamic environments and have to deal with change-induced novelty and uncertainty, the novelty of stimulus is problematic for the modular concept as it does not satisfy the modules criteria for domain specificity. In order to overcome this problem, a potential for (vi) transient variations in domain-specificity (behavioral transitions from exploratory activity to habit formation) have been proposed (Anselme 2012). Explanations for information processing adaptation, however, remain controversial and the form in which such adaptation may take is disputed.…”