Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Embedded Network Sensor Systems 2014
DOI: 10.1145/2668332.2668348
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Mining users' significant driving routes with low-power sensors

Abstract: While there is significant work on sensing and recognition of significant places for users, little attention has been given to users' significant routes. Recognizing these routine journeys, opens doors to the development of novel applications, like personalized travel alerts, and enhancement of user's travel experience. However, the high energy consumption of traditional location sensing technologies, such as GPS or WiFi based localization, is a barrier to passive and ubiquitous route sensing through smartphon… Show more

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Cited by 56 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…We will show how this monitoring app can utilize some OS-level sidechannel attack vectors on iOS (to be discussed shortly) to breach user privacy. Out of the scope are CPU cache side channels [66], electronic magnetic side channels [24], [39], [40], and mobile sensor based side channels [50], [52], [53], [57]. As they explore leakage through micro-architectures, electronic magnetic emission, or device orientation, which are not specific to iOS.…”
Section: A Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…We will show how this monitoring app can utilize some OS-level sidechannel attack vectors on iOS (to be discussed shortly) to breach user privacy. Out of the scope are CPU cache side channels [66], electronic magnetic side channels [24], [39], [40], and mobile sensor based side channels [50], [52], [53], [57]. As they explore leakage through micro-architectures, electronic magnetic emission, or device orientation, which are not specific to iOS.…”
Section: A Threat Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Besides location leakage through GPS [44], [55], accelerometers [23], [41], [47], [53], [59], magnetometer [57], gyroscope [50], [52], [59], and orientation sensor [29], [63] have also been exploited to infer the user's location, movement, and even keystrokes (thus PIN and passwords). These papers all studied sensor-based side channels on Android.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Miluzzo et al [52] uses motion sensors to infer the location of users' taps on the screen. More stealthily, [9,[53][54][55][56] use unrestricted sensors, including gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer, and barometer to infer users' location, driving patterns, and traveled routes. Xu et al, Cai and Chen, Shen et al, Aviv et al, and Owusu et al [1,2,8,46,57] use motion sensors to infer users' keystroke on the smartphone's screen because typing on different locations on the screen may cause changes on the device's motion status, which is reflected on the motion sensors.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…4 The key insight that this system relies on is the fact when a car travels along a particular route, it executes a certain set of maneuvers (turns and bends) that form a unique signature of the route. These turns and bends can be easily detected by the phone carried inside the vehicle using its embedded gyroscope.…”
Section: Sensing Repeated Journeysmentioning
confidence: 99%