Minimal social cues in the dictator game

Rigdon, Mary L.; Ishii, Keiko; Watabe, Motoki; Kitayama, Shinobu

doi:10.1016/j.joep.2009.02.002

Cited by 247 publications

(222 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…Even subtle cues that direct attention toward oneself can lead to surprisingly powerful effects on subsequent moral behavior (5)(6)(7). Signing is one way to activate attention to the self (8).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

RETRACTED: Signing at the beginning makes ethics salient and decreases dishonest self-reports in comparison to signing at the end

Shu

Mažar

Gino

et al. 2012

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

314

247

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Many written forms required by businesses and governments rely on honest reporting. Proof of honest intent is typically provided through signature at the end of, e.g., tax returns or insurance policy forms. Still, people sometimes cheat to advance their financial selfinterests-at great costs to society. We test an easy-to-implement method to discourage dishonesty: signing at the beginning rather than at the end of a self-report, thereby reversing the order of the current practice. Using laboratory and field experiments, we find that signing before-rather than after-the opportunity to cheat makes ethics salient when they are needed most and significantly reduces dishonesty.morality | nudge | policy-making | fraud T he annual tax gap between actual and claimed taxes due in the United States amounts to roughly $345 billion. The Internal Revenue Service estimates more than half this amount is due to individuals misrepresenting their income and deductions (1). Insurance is another domain burdened by the staggering cost of individual dishonesty; the Coalition Against Insurance Fraud estimated that the overall magnitude of insurance fraud in the United States totaled $80 billion in 2006 (2). The problem with curbing dishonesty in behaviors such as filing tax returns, submitting insurance claims, claiming business expenses or reporting billable hours is that they primarily rely on self-monitoring in lieu of external policing. The current paper proposes and tests an efficient and simple measure to reduce such dishonesty.Whereas recent findings have successfully identified an intervention to curtail dishonesty through introducing a code of conduct in contexts where previously there was none (3, 4), many important transactions already require signatures to confirm compliance to an expected standard of honesty. Nevertheless, as significant economic losses demonstrate (1, 2), the current practice appears insufficient in countering self-interested motivations to falsify numbers. We propose that a simple change of the signature location could lead to significant improvements in compliance.Even subtle cues that direct attention toward oneself can lead to surprisingly powerful effects on subsequent moral behavior (5-7). Signing is one way to activate attention to the self (8). However, typically, a signature is requested at the end. Building on Duval and Wicklund's theory of objective self-awareness (9), we propose and test that signing one's name before reporting information (rather than at the end) makes morality accessible right before it is most needed, which will consequently promote honest reporting. We propose that with the current practice of signing after reporting information, the "damage" has already been done: immediately after lying, individuals quickly engage in various mental justifications, reinterpretations, and other "tricks" such as suppressing thoughts about their moral standards that allow them to maintain a positive self-image despite having lied (3, 10, 11). That is, once an individual has lied, it is too ...

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mentioning

confidence: 99%

RETRACTED: Signing at the beginning makes ethics salient and decreases dishonest self-reports in comparison to signing at the end

Shu

Mažar

Gino

et al. 2012

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

314

247

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“…Recent studies suggest that even very subtle cues that one is being watched, such as stylized eyespots on a computer screen, can affect giving behaviour (e.g. [28,29]; cf. [30]).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Wrath of God: religious primes and punishment

et al. 2010

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Recent evidence indicates that priming participants with religious concepts promotes prosocial sharing behaviour. In the present study, we investigated whether religious priming also promotes the costly punishment of unfair behaviour. A total of 304 participants played a punishment game. Before the punishment stage began, participants were subliminally primed with religion primes, secular punishment primes or control primes. We found that religious primes strongly increased the costly punishment of unfair behaviours for a subset of our participants-those who had previously donated to a religious organization. We discuss two proximate mechanisms potentially underpinning this effect. The first is a 'supernatural watcher' mechanism, whereby religious participants punish unfair behaviours when primed because they sense that not doing so will enrage or disappoint an observing supernatural agent. The second is a 'behavioural priming' mechanism, whereby religious primes activate cultural norms pertaining to fairness and its enforcement and occasion behaviour consistent with those norms. We conclude that our results are consistent with dual inheritance proposals about religion and cooperation, whereby religions harness the byproducts of genetically inherited cognitive mechanisms in ways that enhance the survival prospects of their adherents.

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“…Haley and Fessler (25) found that contributions in an anonymous Dictator Game were higher when the computer monitor displayed a pair of stylized eyes than when it displayed plain text. The effects of eyes in the Dictator Game have been replicated (28)(29)(30) and seem to be a function of the expectation of future benefits, not fear of punishment (30).…”

Section: Critiques Of Interpretation Of Behavioral Economics Gamesmentioning

confidence: 92%

Evolutionary foundations of human prosocial sentiments

Silk

House²

2011

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

158

116

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A growing body of evidence shows that humans are remarkably altruistic primates. Food sharing and division of labor play an important role in all human societies, and cooperation extends beyond the bounds of close kinship and networks of reciprocating partners. In humans, altruism is motivated at least in part by empathy and concern for the welfare of others. Although altruistic behavior is well-documented in other primates, the range of altruistic behaviors in other primate species, including the great apes, is much more limited than it is in humans. Moreover, when altruism does occur among other primates, it is typically limited to familiar group members-close kin, mates, and reciprocating partners. This suggests that there may be fundamental differences in the social preferences that motivate altruism across the primate order, and there is currently considerable interest in how we came to be such unusual apes. A body of experimental studies designed to examine the phylogenetic range of prosocial sentiments and behavior is beginning to shed some light on this issue. In experimental settings, chimpanzees and tamarins do not consistently take advantage of opportunities to deliver food rewards to others, although capuchins and marmosets do deliver food rewards to others in similar kinds of tasks. Although chimpanzees do not satisfy experimental criteria for prosociality in food delivery tasks, they help others complete tasks to obtain a goal. Differences in performance across species and differences in performance across tasks are not yet fully understood and raise new questions for further study.prosocial preferences | punishment | fairness

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Minimal social cues in the dictator game

Cited by 247 publications

References 52 publications

RETRACTED: Signing at the beginning makes ethics salient and decreases dishonest self-reports in comparison to signing at the end

RETRACTED: Signing at the beginning makes ethics salient and decreases dishonest self-reports in comparison to signing at the end

Wrath of God: religious primes and punishment

Evolutionary foundations of human prosocial sentiments

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