Might Moral Epistemologists Be Asking The Wrong Questions?

Perl, Caleb

doi:10.1111/phpr.12564

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 50 publications

(25 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…After all, if pluralism is true, there are a plethora of similar but distinct concepts that we could study instead. Hence, at a minimum, 17 Similar points apply to other semantically oriented responses to global skepticism, such as the expressivist-inspired view recently suggested by Field (2018), and to semantically oriented responses to more local forms of skepticism, concerning, e.g., moral beliefs in particular (for a recent example, see Perl (2020), who argues that paying attention to the semantic and pragmatic details of ordinary knowledge ascriptions helps moral realists avoid skeptical challenges to their view).…”

Section: Pluralism and Skepticismmentioning

confidence: 69%

Meta‐Skepticism

Risberg

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The epistemological debate about radical skepticism has focused on whether our beliefs in apparently obvious claims, such as the claim that we have hands, amount to knowledge. Arguably, however, our concept of knowledge is only one of many knowledge-like concepts that there are. If this is correct, it follows that even if our beliefs satisfy our concept of knowledge, there are many other relevantly similar concepts that they fail to satisfy.And this might give us pause. After all, we might wonder: What is so great about the concept of knowledge that we happen to have? Might it be more important, epistemically speaking, to investigate whether our beliefs satisfy some other relevantly similar concept instead?And how should questions such as these even be understood? This paper discusses the epistemological significance of these issues. In particular, a novel skeptical stance called 'meta-skepticism' is introduced, which is a kind of skepticism about the idea that some knowledgelike concepts are epistemically more important than others. It suggested that it is unclear whether this form of skepticism can be avoided.

show abstract

Section: Pluralism and Skepticismmentioning

confidence: 69%

Meta‐Skepticism

Risberg

2022

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Defending the Kratzerian presuppositional error theory

Salinger

2021

Analysis

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper provides a new solution to the problem of moral permissions for the moral error theory. The problem is that the error theorist seems committed to the claim that all actions are morally permitted, as well as to the contradictory claim that no action is morally permitted. My solution understands the moral error theory as the view that folk moral discourse is systematically in error by virtue of suffering from semantic presupposition failure, which I show is consistent with a Kratzerian semantics for deontic modals in natural language. Formally, the solution is to treat the ordering source parameter within Kratzer’s semantics as undefined in the case of folk moral discourse. The paper concludes with thoughts about the import of the solution proffered for the alleged independence of the moral error theory from normative ethics.

show abstract

Imprecise Credences and Acceptance

Lennertz

2022

Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Elga (2010) argues that no plausible decision rule governs action with imprecise credences. I follow Moss (2015a) in claiming that the solution to Elga’s challenge is found in the philosophy of mind, not in devising a special new decision rule. Moss suggests that in decision situations that involve imprecise credences, we must identify with a precise credence, but she says little about identification. By reflecting on the common conception of identification and on what is necessary for Moss’s solution to succeed, I argue that identifying with a precise credence is fundamentally accepting (in the sense of Bratman 1992; Cohen 1989) a proposition about probabilities. The norm on action with imprecise credences is then a special case of the general norm on action and acceptance. I delineate a number of attractive features of this position.

show abstract

Might Moral Epistemologists Be Asking The Wrong Questions?

Cited by 3 publications

References 50 publications

Meta‐Skepticism

Meta‐Skepticism

Defending the Kratzerian presuppositional error theory

Imprecise Credences and Acceptance

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About