Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies 2012
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599370.003.0002
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Cited by 31 publications
(27 citation statements)
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“…Second, corruption is particularly relevant in some Eastern and Southern European (e.g. Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Kopecký et al , 2012) and Western European countries (Singer, 2011b). For example, countries such as Romania or Bulgaria do poorly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and voters in these countries also name corruption as one of the most important issues (Singer, 2011b).…”
Section: The Economic Prerogative In Performance Votingmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Second, corruption is particularly relevant in some Eastern and Southern European (e.g. Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Kopecký et al , 2012) and Western European countries (Singer, 2011b). For example, countries such as Romania or Bulgaria do poorly in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI), and voters in these countries also name corruption as one of the most important issues (Singer, 2011b).…”
Section: The Economic Prerogative In Performance Votingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Democracies in Central Eastern but also Southern Europe often face high levels of corruption and patronage that may overshadow problems in the economic realm (see, e.g. Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Kopecký et al , 2012). In these contexts, including corruption perception enriches the performance voting framework and our knowledge of voting behaviour.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…More specifically, an established literature within the sub‐discipline of party politics has viewed patronage as a critical resource for political parties. Kopecký et al (2008) define party patronage as ‘the power of a political party to appoint people to positions in public and semi‐public life’. Party patronage is therefore primarily concerned with the ability of the political party holding office (that is, the executive) to appoint individuals to senior appointments within the extended state, and considers the ‘reach’ and ‘permeation’ of politicians to act as patrons (Daalder 1966).…”
Section: Reconceptualizing Patronagementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Its intention is not to secure the support of specific individuals, groups or constituencies within a polity, but to demonstrate a much broader governing competency and through this secure electoral support. Patronage, or more specifically PasG, is therefore viewed as ‘a mode of governing’ rather than a normatively questionable, self‐interested and largely hidden exchange relationship (Kopecký et al 2008, p. 8).…”
Section: Reconceptualizing Patronagementioning
confidence: 99%
“…What is studied less is the informal utilization of state resources by political parties in consolidated democracies (e.g. Biezen, 2003a; Kopecký et al ., 2012; Gauja, 2013). These practices are not necessarily illegal but occur in grey zones, in which the actual usage of resources is only vaguely specified or, if partisan use is – in principle – prohibited, not effectively monitored.…”
Section: Informal Party Access To State Resources and The State Of Pamentioning
confidence: 99%