Managing a Peer-to-Peer Data Storage System in a Selfish Society

Maillé, Patrick; Toka, László

doi:10.1109/jsac.2008.080926

Cited by 20 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Therefore, if we consider that the users of a P2P network behave selfishly, we cannot just rely on replication mechanisms and consider that the data stored in a working peer is ''safe'' without a secure control mechanism that continuously verifies this. If both peers are on-line, the problem could easily be solved by performing periodical checks of the data availability as proposed by Toka et al in [22,23]. Michiardi and Toka in [24] presented an analytical model based on game theory for the detection of selfish peer and a similar solution was provided previously by Pamies-Juarez et al in [25].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Off-line incentive mechanism for long-term P2P backup storage

Gramaglia

Urueña

Martínez-Yelmo

2012

Computer Communications

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Keywords:Peer-to-peer (P2P) Long-term storage Incentive mechanism P2P backup Digital cheque a b s t r a c t This paper presents a micro-payment-based incentive mechanism for long-term peer-to-peer storage systems. The main novelty of the proposed incentive mechanism is to allow users to be off-line for extended periods of time without updating or renewing their information by themselves. This feature is enabled through a digital cheque, issued by the user, which is later employed by the peers to get a gratification for storing the user's information when the user is off-line. The proposed P2P backup system also includes a secure and lightweight data verification mechanism. Moreover, the proposed incentive also contributes to improve the availability of the stored information and the scalability of the whole system. The paper details the verification and cheque-based incentive mechanisms in the context of a P2P backup service and analyzes its scalability and security properties. The system is furthermore validated by means of simulation, proving the effectiveness of the proposed incentive.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Therefore, it seems better to choose an appropriate nonce length (N bits), based on the chunk size (S bits) and digest's length of the hash function (H bits). Then: S 6 2 N Á H ) N P log 2 ðS=HÞ ð 7Þ Which means that with S ¼ 1 MB ¼ 2 23 bit-long chunks and MD5…”

Section: Security Of the Incentive And Verification Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Off-line incentive mechanism for long-term P2P backup storage

Gramaglia

Urueña

Martínez-Yelmo

2012

Computer Communications

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“…A number of related works focus on economic modeling of backup and storage systems and focus in particular on incentive mechanisms: we point the reader to [15] and its references for an overview of such works. In [15] selfish user behavior is described using non-cooperative game theory: users are modeled by their strategies on their demand (in terms of amount of data to backup) and their offer (offered resources such as storage space, available bandwidth and uptime).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analysis of user-driven peer selection in peer-to-peer backup and storage systems

Toka

Michiardi

2010

Telecommun Syst

Self Cite

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In this paper we present a model of peer-to-peer backup and storage systems in which users have the ability to selfishly select remote peers they want to exchange data with. In our work, peer characteristics (e.g., on-line availability, dedicated bandwidth) play an important role and are reflected in the model through a single parameter, termed profile. We show that selecting remote peers selfishly, based on their profiles, creates incentives for users to improve their contribution to the system. Our work is based on an extension to well known results in Matching Theory, which allows us to formulate the Stable Exchange Game, in which we shift the algorithmic nature of matching problems to a game theoretic framework. We propose a polynomial-time algorithm to compute welfare-maximizing stable exchanges between peers and show, using an evolutionary game theoretic framework, that even semi-random peer selection strategies, that are easily implementable in practice, can be effective in providing incentives to users in order to improve their profiles.

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“…However, it has been acknowledged since then [14,15] that those pure peer-to-peer architectures may fail to deliver reliable storage by exploiting the resources of peers, mainly due to the low availability of peers and the slow up-link of their network connections. One straightforward solution is to exclude peers with a low availability or a slow network connection to access the service [16]; this nevertheless excludes many participants and significant amounts of exploitable resources [1,2].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performance evaluation of a peer-to-peer backup system using buffering at the edge

Kermarrec¹,

Merrer²,

Scouarnec³

et al. 2014

Computer Communications

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The availability of end devices of peer-to-peer storage and backup systems has been shown to be critical for usability and for system reliability in practice. This has led to the adoption of hybrid architectures composed of both peers and servers. Such architectures mask the instability of peers thus approaching the performances of client-server systems while providing scalability at a low cost. In this paper, we advocate the replacement of such servers by a cloud of residential gateways, as they are already present in users' homes, thus pushing the required stable components at the edge of the network. In our gateway-assisted system, gateways act as buffers between peers, compensating for their intrinsic instability. We model such a system, for quick dimensioning and estimation of gains. We then evaluate our proposal using statistical distributions based on real world traces, as well as a trace of residential gateways for availability (that we have collected and now make available). Results show that the time required to backup data in the network is substantially improved, as it drops from days to a few hours. As gateways are becoming increasingly powerful in order to enable new services, we expect such a proposal to be leveraged on a short term basis.

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Managing a Peer-to-Peer Data Storage System in a Selfish Society

Cited by 20 publications

References 8 publications

Off-line incentive mechanism for long-term P2P backup storage

Off-line incentive mechanism for long-term P2P backup storage

Analysis of user-driven peer selection in peer-to-peer backup and storage systems

Performance evaluation of a peer-to-peer backup system using buffering at the edge

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