2009 International Conference on Game Theory for Networks 2009
DOI: 10.1109/gamenets.2009.5137394
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MAC games for distributed wireless network security with incomplete information of selfish and malicious user types

Abstract: Abstract-We consider game theoretic models of wireless medium access control (MAC) in which each transmitter makes individual decisions regarding their power level or transmission probability. This allows for scalable distributed operation; however, it can also enable users to pursue malicious objectives such as jamming other nodes to deny them service. We study games with two types of players: selfish and malicious transmitters. Each type is characterized by a utility function depending on throughput reward a… Show more

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Cited by 66 publications
(39 citation statements)
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“…In [Sagduyu et al 2009], a game-theoretic framework with incomplete information is developed for denial of service attacks at the MAC layer of wireless networks. The wireless nodes in the network can be of two types, either selfish or malicious, and have incomplete information regarding the types of other nodes.…”
Section: Jammingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [Sagduyu et al 2009], a game-theoretic framework with incomplete information is developed for denial of service attacks at the MAC layer of wireless networks. The wireless nodes in the network can be of two types, either selfish or malicious, and have incomplete information regarding the types of other nodes.…”
Section: Jammingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Each node choose its channel access probabilities independently with xed transmission power Nash equilibrium [71] Strategy: Transmission Power.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In [9], Bayesian jamming games are considered and the Nash Equilibrium (NE) points for different jamming scenarios are obtained. Unlike the work in [9], we consider pricing mechanisms and auctions [10] in the presence of malicious users and also modify them to counter malicious behavior.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unlike the work in [9], we consider pricing mechanisms and auctions [10] in the presence of malicious users and also modify them to counter malicious behavior. Our model captures the fact that, in addition to the resource allocation, the malicious users affect the regular users through the prices charged to the regular users.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%