Lula and the Continuity of Neoliberalism in Brazil: Strategic Choice, Economic Imperative or Political Schizophrenia?

Da economia política à política econômica: o novo-desenvolvimentismo e o governo Lula

“…Esses críticos, muitos deles antigos apoiadores ou militantes do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) e de outras organizações de esquerda, vinham se sentindo crescentemente alienados com a guinada à direita do PT a partir de 1989, e sua acomodação ao jogo político institucional (ver Morais e Saad-Filho, 2005).…”

“…A divisão principal se dava entre aqueles que consideravam essa continuidade como produto da fraqueza ideológica do governo Lula, que tinha escolhido trocar de valores ao chegar ao poder (Cardim de Carvalho, 2003;Paulani, 2003), e aqueles que defendiam ser tal continuidade fruto de uma situação contingente de correlação de forças políticas, que impunha o abandono das propostas petistas de administração do Estado professadas antes das eleições (Barbosa e Souza, 2010;Morais e Saad-Filho, 2005;Novelli, 2010;Sallum Jr. e Kugelmas, 2004).…”

The Power of Money: Global Financial Markets, National Politics, and Social Determinants of Health

“…A broadly similar analysis would appear applicable to Brazil, where the 2002 concession to IMF standards of macroeconomic management has been identified as crucial to the ability of the PT's presidential candidate, Luiz Inácio (Lula) da Silva, to appeal successfully to a diverse electoral coalition that included some highly privileged elements of Brazilian society (Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005). Lula's reelection in 2006, in which he was able to consolidate his appeal to some of the poorest Brazilians -a success that was not reflected in the PT's legislative standings -has been attributed in part to the benefits conferred on these marginalized constituencies by Bolsa Família (Hunter & Power, 2007).…”

“…"Having experienced a 40 percent fall in the value of Brazil's currency in the course of a few months," the last stage of a longer-term decline that drove the Real from a value of R1.32/US$1 in January 1999 to R3.46/US$1 in July 2002, that is to say shortly before the IMF announcement, the PT "chose to suffer low growth, high unemployment and flat levels of social expenditure rather than risk retribution from the global financial actors who constitute 'the markets'" (Evans, 2005, p. 196, citation omitted; see also Morais & Saad-Filho, 2005;Amann & Baer, 2006, p. 221-223;Paiva, 2006;Koelble & Lipuma, 2006, p. 623-625). Indeed, the Brazilian government not only kept interest rates high and inflation low but also ran an even 8 larger primary budget surplus (that is, a surplus before debt service obligations are taken into account) than demanded by the IMF.…”

Everywhere Taksim: Sowing the Seeds for a New Turkey at Gezi

“…Liberalisation of trade, finance and capital flows dismantled the industrial base in many of the country's manufacturing centres and poor economic performance undermined domestic consumption, which, in turn, strangled investment and further exacerbated fiscal imbalances (see Amann and Baer 2000). Much like AKP, PT's first election victory was based on building a 'losers' alliance' unifying different sections of capital, the manufacturing sector above all, under the premises of sustainable economic growth, and providing a wider base of support among the subordinate classes, which had been penalised by job cuts, a decline in real wages and the contraction of public services that accompanied Brazil's neoliberal transition (Morais and Saad-Filho 2005). PT's reconstruction of the system of power was geared toward satisfying the needs of financial capital and export-oriented sectors, while remaining loyal to the IMF-agreed programme to reach, or even exceed, the fiscal plus target (Kliass 2011).…”