Logic, language and the brain

Monti, Martin M.; Osherson, Daniel N.

doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2011.05.061

Cited by 44 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 79 publications

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“…On the other hand, a number of studies have failed to uncover any significant activation within Broca's area for propositional and categorical deductive inferences (Canessa et al, ; Kroger, Nystrom, Cohen, & Johnson‐Laird, ; Monti, Osherson, Martinez, & Parsons, ; Monti, Parsons, & Osherson, ; Noveck, Goel, & Smith, ; Parsons & Osherson, ; Rodriguez‐Moreno & Hirsch, ), even under much more naturalistic experimental conditions (Prado et al, ). An alternative hypothesis has thus been proposed under which logic is subserved by a set of language‐independent regions within frontopolar (i.e., BA10) and frontomedial (i.e., BA8) cortices, among others (Monti & Osherson, ; Monti et al, ). Consistent with this proposal, neuropsychological investigations have shown that lesions extending at through medial BA8 are sufficient to impair deductive inference‐making, as well as meta‐cognitive assessments of inference complexity, despite an anatomically intact Broca's Area and ceiling performance on neuropsychological assessments of language function (Reverberi, Shallice, D'agostini, Skrap, & Bonatti, ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In what follows, we report on a 3T functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study in which we tested whether the pattern of activations that has been previously characterized as “core” to deductive inference (Monti et al, ; see Monti & Osherson, for a review) might instead reflect activity resulting from increased general non‐deductive cognitive load (a view we will label the general cognitive load hypothesis ). Specifically, using a 2 × 2 design (simple/complex, deductive/non‐deductive), we compare the effect of non‐deductive (e.g., working memory) versus deductive load on the putative “core” regions of deduction.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…under much more naturalistic experimental conditions (Prado et al, 2015). An alternative hypothesis has thus been proposed under which logic is subserved by a set of language-independent regions within frontopolar (i.e., BA10) and frontomedial (i.e., BA8) cortices, among others (Monti & Osherson, 2012;Monti et al, 2007Monti et al, , 2009. Consistent with this proposal, neuropsychological investigations have shown that lesions extending at through medial BA8 are sufficient to impair deductive inference-making, as well as meta-cognitive assessments of inference complexity, despite an anatomically intact Broca's Area and ceiling performance on neuropsychological assessments of language function (Reverberi, Shallice, D'agostini, Skrap, & Bonatti, 2009).…”

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confidence: 99%

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At the core of reasoning: Dissociating deductive and non‐deductive load

Coetzee

Monti

2018

Human Brain Mapping

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In recent years, neuroimaging methods have been used to investigate how the human mind carries out deductive reasoning. According to some, the neural substrate of language is integral to deductive reasoning. According to others, deductive reasoning is supported by a language-independent distributed network including left frontopolar and frontomedial cortices. However, it has been suggested that activity in these frontal regions might instead reflect non-deductive factors such as working memory load and general cognitive difficulty. To address this issue, 20 healthy volunteers participated in an fMRI experiment in which they evaluated matched simple and complex deductive and non-deductive arguments in a 2 × 2 design. The contrast of complex versus simple deductive trials resulted in a pattern of activation closely matching previous work, including frontopolar and frontomedial "core" areas of deduction as well as other "cognitive support" areas in frontoparietal cortices. Conversely, the contrast of complex and simple non-deductive trials resulted in a pattern of activation that does not include any of the aforementioned "core" areas. Direct comparison of the load effect across deductive and non-deductive trials further supports the view that activity in the regions previously interpreted as "core" to deductive reasoning cannot merely reflect non-deductive load, but instead might reflect processes specific to the deductive calculus. Finally, consistent with previous reports, the classical language areas in left inferior frontal gyrus and posterior temporal cortex do not appear to participate in deductive inference beyond their role in encoding stimuli presented in linguistic format.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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At the core of reasoning: Dissociating deductive and non‐deductive load

Coetzee

Monti

2018

Human Brain Mapping

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“…• Monti and Osherson (2012) report that, almost counter-intuitively, the role of language in reasoning is confined to an initial stage where verbally presented information is encoded as non-verbal representations. These are subsequently manipulated by mental operations that are not based on the neural mechanisms which handle natural language.…”

Section: Concept Creation and Rememberingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manipulating Models and Grasping the Ideas They Represent

Bryce

Blown

2016

Sci & Educ

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This article notes the convergence of recent thinking in neuroscience and grounded cognition regarding the way we understand mental representation and recollection: ideas are dynamic and multi-modal, actively created at the point of recall. Also, neurophysiologically, re-entrant signalling among cortical circuits allows non-conscious processing to support our deliberative thoughts and actions. The qualitative research we describe examines the exchanges occurring during semi-structured interviews with 360 children age 3-13, including 294 from New Zealand (158 boys, 136 girls) and 66 from China (34 boys, 32 girls) concerning their understanding of the shape and motion of the Earth, Sun and Moon (ESM). We look closely at the relationships between what is revealed as children manipulate their own play-dough models and their apparent understandings of ESM concepts. In particular, we focus on the switching taking place between what is said, what is drawn and what is modelled. The evidence is supportive of Edelman's view that memory is non-representational and that concepts are the outcome of perceptual mappings, a view which is also in accord with Barsalou's notion that concepts are simulators or skills which operate consistently across several modalities. Quantitative data indicate that the dynamic structure of memory/concept creation is similar in both genders and common to the cultures/ethnicities compared (New Zealand European and Māori; Chinese Han) and that repeated interviews in this longitudinal research lead to more advanced modelling skills and/or more advanced shape and motion concepts, the results supporting hypotheses (Kolmogorov-Smirnov alpha levels .05; r s : p \ .001).

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“…Using such logical structures, these studies have consistently reported activation of distributed cortical and sub-cortical networks, including those associated with language processing and semantic and visuo-spatial skills (see for review [10]–[15]). Lateralized effects have also been reported, with the left hemisphere playing a key role in linguistic processes and the right hemisphere mainly supporting logical reasoning [11], [12], [16], [17], although other studies have found key linguistic and logical processes to be in different sub-areas in the left hemisphere [5], [7], [8].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contradictory Reasoning Network: An EEG and fMRI Study

et al. 2014

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Contradiction is a cornerstone of human rationality, essential for everyday life and communication. We investigated electroencephalographic (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in separate recording sessions during contradictory judgments, using a logical structure based on categorical propositions of the Aristotelian Square of Opposition (ASoO). The use of ASoO propositions, while controlling for potential linguistic or semantic confounds, enabled us to observe the spatial temporal unfolding of this contradictory reasoning. The processing started with the inversion of the logical operators corresponding to right middle frontal gyrus (rMFG-BA11) activation, followed by identification of contradictory statement associated with in the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG-BA47) activation. Right medial frontal gyrus (rMeFG, BA10) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, BA32) contributed to the later stages of process. We observed a correlation between the delayed latency of rBA11 response and the reaction time delay during inductive vs. deductive reasoning. This supports the notion that rBA11 is crucial for manipulating the logical operators. Slower processing time and stronger brain responses for inductive logic suggested that examples are easier to process than general principles and are more likely to simplify communication.

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Logic, language and the brain

Cited by 44 publications

References 79 publications

At the core of reasoning: Dissociating deductive and non‐deductive load

At the core of reasoning: Dissociating deductive and non‐deductive load

Manipulating Models and Grasping the Ideas They Represent

Contradictory Reasoning Network: An EEG and fMRI Study

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