Levels of consciousness and self-awareness: A comparison and integration of various neurocognitive views

From armchair to wheelchair: How patients with a locked-in syndrome integrate bodily changes in experienced identity

“…If real patients can adjust to massive bodily changes because of a psychological meaningfulness in their life, then personal identity might be as plastic as brain plasticity: no matter how important the objective bodily change is as long as the patient acknowledges it as meaningful. In this sense, our findings are in accordance with contemporary models of experienced identity as a subjective process of adjustment to changes (Morin, 2006) partially based on what we called here experienced meaning in life (Bernheim, 1999). Further research could develop the dimension of experienced meaning in life as constitutive of the experienced identity.…”

“…Diachronic identity refers to the property of any being to remain itself across time. In the case of personal diachronic identity, it seems fairly intuitive that the 31-year old Sophie is in some sense the same person as the 15-year old Sophie, despite the constant cells renewal in her body (Carosella, Saint-Sernin, Capelle, & Sanchez-Sodondo, 2008;Christman, 2004;Damasio, 1999;Gallagher, 2000;Morin, 2006). But would a more radical bodily change impact on Sophie's personal identity?…”

Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness

“…Recent work on the psychology and neuroscience of self-consciousness can be seen as exemplifying this research strategy. Instead of focusing on 'higher' forms of self-consciousness involved in, for example, mastery of the 'I' concept (Bermúdez, 1998;Peacocke, 2008), mirror self-recognition (Gallup, 1975;Morin, 2006) and understanding of one's own identity over time (Gallagher, 2000;Morin, 2006), a number of researchers have instead focused on more basic, bodily forms of self-consciousness. In particular, they have explored the ways in which multisensory bodily illusions can modulate the experience of oneself as a bodily subject.…”

Sense of identity in advanced Alzheimer’s dementia: A cognitive dissociation between sameness and selfhood?

“…In psychology, the self is viewed as a complex multi-dimensional construct with a structural level of self-representation in memory (Kihlstrom, Beer & Klein, 2002) and a set of self-related functional processes required to evoke self-representations (Morin, 2006;Stuss, …”