Legislative cohesion and presidential policy success

Sinclair, Barbara

doi:10.1080/1357233042000306245

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Adopting this working definition allows me to contribute to broader conversations in political science about the conditions under which groups of political actors are most likely to achieve their mission. My study on the cohesion of protesters complements research on the cohesion of party members (e.g., Hazan 2003; Sinclair 2003) and members of advocacy organizations (e.g., Junk 2019; Mueller 2021).…”

Section: Theory: Cohesion Comprehension and Persuasionmentioning

confidence: 82%

“…Scholars construe it inconsistently as social bonding, attachment to a group, and shared purpose (Casey‐Campbell and Martens 2009). I define cohesion as agreement on a goal , applying a definition from the literature on party cohesion (Hazan 2003; Sinclair 2003). Similar to what political theorist Sally Scholz (2008) terms “political solidarity,” protesters are cohesive when they aspire to a common vision of social change.…”

Section: Theory: Cohesion Comprehension and Persuasionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Crowd Cohesion and Protest Outcomes

Mueller

2022

American J Political Sci

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Amidst an unprecedented swell in global protest, scholars and activists wrestle with the question of why protests succeed or fail. I explore a new answer: more cohesive crowds, where protesters agree on their demands, are more likely to win concessions than less cohesive crowds. Drawing on psychology and linguistics, I theorize that cohesive demands are more comprehensible and thus persuasive. I test this theory with a multimethod approach. First, I use cross‐national data from 97 protests to estimate the relationship between crowd cohesion and subsequent concessions, applying natural language processing to measure cohesion in participants’ self‐reported motivations. Second, a survey experiment in South Africa tests the causal effects of crowd cohesion and assesses comprehensibility of demands as the mechanism driving concessions. Third, case studies of two British protests demonstrate the theory in real‐world settings. My findings suggest that activists can improve their odds of success by coordinating around a common goal.

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Section: Theory: Cohesion Comprehension and Persuasionmentioning

confidence: 82%

Section: Theory: Cohesion Comprehension and Persuasionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Crowd Cohesion and Protest Outcomes

Mueller

2022

American J Political Sci

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“…La última de las decisiones de acción colectiva tiene que ver con la «imposición de la obediencia» (Ozbudun, 1970). La actuación conjunta de la bancada facilita la agregación de intereses, así como el éxito legislativo de sus iniciativas (Bowler et al, 1999;Sinclair, 2003). Con este propósito, los partidos establecen regímenes disciplinarios que aumenten el coste de las maniobras disidentes de los legisladores (Carey y Shugart, 1994;Owens, 2003).…”

Section: Marco Teórico E Hipótesisunclassified

Determinantes de la percepción de corrupción legislativa en América Latina (1990-2016)

Sánchez¹,

Díaz²

2021

Rev. Estud. Polít.

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Este trabajo identifica los cambios y continuidades en la percepción de la corrupción legislativa en América Latina en el periodo 1990-‍2016. A partir de los datos de opinión del proyecto «Varieties of Democracy» de la Universidad de Gotemburgo y el Instituto Kellogg, se explora el peso que podrían tener variables partidistas e institucionales sobre la percepción de la existencia de actividades ilícitas en los legislativos latinoamericanos. Los datos revelan que la ausencia de mecanismos de control y fiscalización ejercidos por el órgano legislativo y la jurisdicción ordinaria, la mercantilización de la movilización electoral y el peso de los intereses particularistas frente al bien común, son los factores que incrementan la probabilidad de percibir como corrupta la labor parlamentaria.

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“…New presidential administrations take office with robust legislative agendas that seek to advance the president's policy priorities (Bond and Fleisher 1990;Chamberlain 1946;Cohen 2012;Lee 2008;sinclair 2003). drawing upon both formal and informal bargaining tools (Beckmann 2010(Beckmann , 2016Cameron 2000), presidents attempt to shape the contents of legislative enactments while meeting voters' expectations that they "do something about everything" (Neustadt 1990, 7).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Unilateral Inaction: Congressional Gridlock, Interbranch Conflict, and Public Evaluations of Executive Power

Reeves

Rogowski

2021

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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Presidents routinely overpromise and underdeliver, especially amid partisan polarization, narrow congressional majorities, and persistent gridlock. As Congress routinely stymies their legislative agendas, presidents consider alternative courses of action. We study public reactions to unilateral power in the context of congressional inaction. While some research suggests that presidents cannot afford to pass up opportunities to act, more recent scholarship indicates that the public holds negative views of unilateral power and disapproves of its use. Survey experiments conducted with a national sample of Americans provide evidence of the costs of unilateral power. Across three policy areas and between‐ and within‐respondent analyses, the public responds negatively when presidents exercise unilateral power rather than accept the status quo, even among individuals who share the president's policy views. Our results suggest that while legislative gridlock may increase the appeal of unilateral power, its use may come at a public cost.

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Legislative cohesion and presidential policy success

Cited by 7 publications

References 0 publications

Crowd Cohesion and Protest Outcomes

Crowd Cohesion and Protest Outcomes

Determinantes de la percepción de corrupción legislativa en América Latina (1990-2016)

Unilateral Inaction: Congressional Gridlock, Interbranch Conflict, and Public Evaluations of Executive Power

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